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THE SILENCED MAJORITY: MARTIN
v. WILKS AND THE LEGISLATIVE
RESPONSE
Susan S. Grover•
An American worker finds himself disadvantaged by an employer's affirmative action program. The worker heads for the courthouse, reverse discrimination complaint in hand. Will he be allowed
to sue? Prior to the Supreme Court's 1989 Martin v. Wilks decision,
the answer to that question tended to be "no. " Wilks changed the
answer to an emphatic 'yes." With the 1991 Civil Rights Act, the
answer has become "probably not. " This article discusses the bar
against such challenges as developed through case law and recent congressional action. It addresses the implications that the new statutory
bar will have for the structure of discrimination suits. The article also
advocates measures that will both enhance the prospects for consent
decree finality and preserve the legal rights of the American working
majority.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Imagine that a group of minority employees file suit alleging that
their employer has discriminated against them because of their race. The
employees and their employer agree to settle the case, with the employer
undertaking affirmative action measures designed to enhance employment opportunities for minorities, As usually happens, the parties ask
the court to enter the agreement as a consent decree. 1 The employer
fulfills its affirmative action promises, and that ends the matter-until a
• Assistant Professor of Law, College of William & Mary. A.B. 1973, Hollins College; J.D.
1983, Georgetown University. The College of William and Mary provided summer research grant
suppon for this project.
l. A consent decree is a hybrid combining qualities ofboth contracts and judgments. United
States v. ITI Continental Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 235-37 (1975). The substance of the decree is
arrived at contractually, by mutual agreement of the parties seeking to settle the case. /d. at 234-35.
As one author defined it, "[a] consent decree is a settlement agreement among the parties to a lawsuit, signed by the court and entered as a judgment in the case." Maimon Schwarzschild, Public
Law by Private Bargain: Title VII Consent Decrees and the Fairness of Negotiated Institutional Reform, 1984 DUKE L.J. 887, 894. Violation of the decree, like violation of a judgment, is punishable
by contempt. /IT Continental Baking Co., 420 U.S. at 226; Apex Fountain Sales, Inc. v. Kleinfeld,
818 F.2d 1089, 1097-98 (3d Cir. 1987); United States v. City of Miami, 664 F.2d 435, 439-40 (5th
Cir. 1981 ). Consent decrees are very popular vehicles for the resolution of Title VII and other public
law cases. Schwarzschild, supra, at 899. Such decrees serve the shared intereSt of the court and the
parties in avoiding the expense and burdens of trial and the plaintiff's interest in obtaining a settle-
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group of white employees2 learns that minority employees are securing
employment opportunities that traditionally would have been theirs.
When the white employees make this discovery, they file suit against the
employer, alleging that the employer is discriminating against them on
the basis of their race by preferring minority employees. 3
In recent years, there has been great controversy over whether white
employees should be permitted to bring reverse discrimination suits challenging affirmative action taken pursuant to consent decrees. The federal
courts initially barred such challenges as "impermissible collateral attacks. " 4 That doctrine precluded challenges to consent decrees unless
intervenors raised the challenges in the decree suit itself. The Supreme
Court rejected the collateral attack doctrine in 1989 in Martin v. Wilks, 5
according majority employees carte blanche to challenge affirmative action consent decrees. Congress's 1990 attempt6 to overrule Wilks legislatively met with a presidential veto. 7 In 1991, however, Congress
successfully enacted legislation that partially overruled Wilks .8 As the
ment enforceable by the court's contempt power. See Larry Kramer, Consent Decrees and the Rights
of Third Parties, 87 MICH. L. REV. 321, 326-27 (1988).
The Supreme Court has stated that "federal courts should act only after hearing 'a clash of
adversary argument exploring every aspect of a multifaceted situation embracing conflicting and
demanding interests.'" Schwarzschild, supra, at 903 (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97 {1967)
(citing United States v. Freuhauf, 365 U.S. 146, 157 (1961))). Nevertheless, the federal courts today
are deemed empowered to enter consent decrees arising precisely from the absence of controversy.
ITT Continental Baking Co., 420 U.S. at 243; United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 119 (1931).
2. This article speaks of "white" or "majority" employees to refer to any group that might file
a challenge to actions taken pursuant to a consent decree. Such employees could, in fact, conceivably be members of a minority group not benefited by the decree.
3. The Supreme Court has recognized that such claims of "reverse discrimination" state
causes of action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See McDonald v. Sante Fe Trail
Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
4. The doctrine arguably is misnamed because a "collateral" attack often is thought of as an
attack on a judgment by a party to the judgment. See United States v. City of Chicago, 870 F.2d
1256, 1262 (7th Cir. 1989). The majority challengers contemplated here are, by definition, not parties. Nevertheless, the term "collateral" does serve to emphasize the crucial distinction between
separate suits brought to challenge a decree "collaterally" and direct challenges mounted by majority employers who have intervened in the decree suit itself.
5. 490 u.s. 755 (1989).
6. S. 2104, lOist Cong., 2d Sess. § 6 (1989); H .R. 4000, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 6 (1989)
[hereinafter collectively cited as Civil Rights Act of 1990].
7. The number of votes garnered to override that veto fell just short of the required two-thirds
majority. 136 CONG. REC. S. 16589 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1990).
8. Section 108 of the 1991 Act provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, and except as provided in paragraph (2), an
employment practice that implements and is within the scope of a litigated or consent judgment
or order that resolves a claim of employment discrimination under the Constitution or Federal
civil rights laws may not be challenged under the circumstances described in subparagraph (B).
(B) A practice described in subparagraph (A) may not be challenged in a claim under the
Constitution or Federal civil rights laws(i) by a person who, prior to the entry of the judgment or order described in subparagraph (A), had(1) actual notice of the proposed judgment or order sufficient to apprise such person
that such judgment or order might adversely affect the interests and legal rights of such
person and that an opportunity was available to present objections to such judgment or
order by a future date certain; and
(II) a reasonable opportunity to present objections to such judgment or order; or
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law now stands, then, the majority employees in our hypothetical probably are barred from bringing a subsequent reverse discrimination suit
when they feel the effects of the consent decree that resolved the earlier
case. 9 Whether they should be barred from bringing such a suit is a complex question.
The tension between the need to allow collateral challenges and the
need to immunize decrees from such challenges arises from the conflict
between the goal of assuring that majority employees receive their day in
court and the goal of assuring the finality of settlements that have been
long and costly in the making. The bar, whether common law or statutory, diminishes the whites' day in court. It effectively relegates them to
intervention in the original minority suit against the employer or forces
them to rely on representation provided by a similarly situated person
who did, in fact, present objections in the decree suit. This gives the
white would-be plaintiffs legitimate cause for concern. Even if they have
had an opportunity to intervene in the original suit, they are losing the
right to pursue independently any valid claims they may have. On the
other hand, proponents of the bar argue that both the judiciary and employment discrimination litigants would face very practical difficulties if
majority employees could challenge consent decrees collaterally.
Most importantly, the prospect of collateral attacks significantly diminishes the incentive to settle. This is especially true for employers who
expend resources to implement the required affirmative action, only to be
forced then to litigate the decree's legality and perhaps dismantle any
affirmative action undertaken. To the extent that the bar decreases settlement potential, it also burdens the courts, because settlements are by
far the most common and efficient way to terminate employment discrimination suits. Diminishing settlement prospects also reduces the
(ii) by a person whose interests were adequately represented by another person who had
previously challenged the judgment or order on the same legal grounds and with a similar
factual situation, unless there has been an intervening change in law or fact.
(2) Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to(A) alter the standards for intervention under rule 24 of the Fedeni.l Rules of Civil Procedure or apply to the rights of parties who have successfully intervened pursuant to such rule in
the proceeding in which the parties intervened;
(B) apply to the rights of parties to the action in which a litigated or consent judgment or
order was entered, or of members of a class represented or sought to be represented in such
action, or of members of a group on whose behalf relief was sought in such action by the
Federal Government;
(C) prevent challenges to a litigated or consent judgment or order on the ground that such
judgment or order was obtained through collusion or fraud, or is transparently invalid or was
entered by a court lacking subject matter jurisdiction; or
(D) authorize or permit the denial to any person of the due process of law required by the
Constitution.
(3) Any action not precluded under this subsection that challenges an employment consent
judgment or order described in paragraph (1) shall be brought in the court, and if possible
before the judge, that entered such judgment or order. Nothing in this subsection shall preclude
a transfer of such action pursuant to section 1404 of title 28, United States Code.
Civil Rights Act of 1991, sec. 108, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, 1076-77 (Nov. 21, 1991) (to
be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2).
9. /d. The Act's effective date is November 21, 1991. /d. sec. 402, 105 Stat. at 1099.
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sum total of affirmative action ultimately accomplished as a result of employment discrimination litigation because courts scrutinize affirmative
action in a consent decree less closely than affirmative action contained
in a court order following full adjudication.
Issues of how and when collateral attacks on consent decrees should
be barred raise due process concerns, involve problems of judicial economy for already overburdened courts, and implicate the commitment to
reducing employment discrimination through affirmative action. Therefore, resolving the problems that the collateral attack bar presents is important. This article undertakes that resolution.
Properly applied, the legislative bar can protect majority employees
and, simultaneously, assure the finality of consent decrees. Although alternatives considered in the legislative process might have caused due
process concerns, the bar finally enacted is free of constitutional infirmities. 10 In particular, the legislative bar of suits by majority employees
who have had notice and an opportunity to be heard and of people whose
interests have been adequately represented adequately protects the interests of the bound absentees. This article therefore focuses more on
proper implementation of the bar than on the propriety of the bar itself.
This article considers a major change in the legislation effectuated
between the time the legislation was vetoed in 1990 and the time it was
enacted in 1991. This change, deletion of a category of individuals to
whom constitutionally adequate efforts at notice have been made, will
have both positive and negative implications for the Act's effectiveness.
On the positive side, the deletion virtually eliminates the potential that
accomplishment of the Act's goals will be thwarted by lawsuits challenging the Act's constitutionality. The deletion effectively rids the Act of
the only constitutionally troubling provision. On the negative side, the
deletion leaves the door open to a vast number of challenges that would
have been impermissible under the vetoed 1990 version. This article recommends mechanisms that, by partially closing the gap, will permit an
expansive construction of the remaining categories of preclusion to compensate for the deletion.
This article also considers the structure of litigation in which the bar
may operate. Specifically, the article proposes three ways in which
courts should adjust decision making in light of the bar adopted. It argues that judges should rarely use Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure-requiring parties to join additional "necessary parties"-in
original suits. Courts should, by contrast, apply Rule 24 liberally to permit majority employee intervention in such cases. Courts also should
scrutinize proposed consent decrees more closely than in the past and, in
10. A bar, proposed but ultimately rejected, relied on adequacy of efforts to notify majority
employees, even though those bound would receive no actual notice. This bar might have been
sufficiently protective if courts had implemented proper precautionary measures.
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the course of that scrutiny, should apply standards that have been established inr 'cases of postentry review.
II.

JUDICIAL GROUNDWORK FOR CONGRESSIONAL ENACTMENT OF
THE COLLATERAL A TrACK BAR

Two judicial trends~precipitated Congress's enactment of the 1991
Civil Rights Act's section 108, which bars collateral challenges to consent decrees. One trend was the development among lower federal courts
of a common law doctrine barring such challenges. The other was a
countervailing trend in the Supreme Court to shift protections from minority victims of discrimination to majority employees who might be injured by consent decrees to which the majority employees were not party.

A.

The Judicially-Created Impermissible Collateral Attack Doctrine

At its inception, the bar against attacks on consent decrees was a
creature of the common law. By 1988, most federal circuits had rejected
attempts by majority employees to use "reverse discrimination" suits to
attack consent decrees settling earlier employment discrimination suits. 11
The courts rejecting these suits characterized the suits as "impermissible
collateraJ attacks." 12 Instead of allowing such independent law suits,
courts limited the majority employees to pressing their challenges as intervenors in the original suit that produced the consent decree. 13
Courts differed on a number of the doctrine's elements. Some courts
imposed an absolute bar on all lawsuits that challenged action taken pur11. See Ashley v. City ofJackson, 464 U.S. 900, 902 (1983)(Rehnquist, J., joined by Brennan,
J ., dissenting from denial of certiorari); Marino v. Ortiz, 806 F.ld 1144, 1146 (ld Cir. 1986}, a.ff'd by
an equally divided court, 484 U.S. 301 (1988}; Stotts v. Memphis Fire Dep't, 679 F.2d 541, 558 (6th
Cir. 1982}, rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S.
561 (1984); Mark E. Recktenwald, Comment, Collateral Attacks on Employment Discrimination
Consent Decrees, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 147, 172 (1986). See generally Kramer, supra note 1. Some
courts and cOmmentators questioned whether the doctrine should apply to judgments as well as to
consent decrees. One view was that judgments could be applied more fairly to bind nonparties
because judgments result from adjudication, whereas consent decrees merely result from private
contractual agreements. Ashley, 464 U.S. at 902. Another view was that the congressional preference for Title VII settlements spawned the impermissible collateral attack doctrine, see Thaggard v.
City of Jackson, 687 F.ld 66, 69 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 900 (1983), so that it logically
should not extend to judgments. It also has been argued that, if the preference for settlement was the
only ground for the doctrine, then the doctrine was an unfounded and improper piece of judicial
legislation. Kramer, supra note 1, at 335, 339.
12. Marino, 806 F.ld 1144; Devereaux v. Geary, 765 F.2d 268 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 478
U.S. 1021 (1986); Thaggard, 687 F.2d at 69; Stotts, 619 F.2d 541; Dennison v. City of Los Angeles
Dep't of Water & Power, 658 F.2d 694 (9th Cir. 1981); Society Hill Civic Ass'n v. Harris, 632 F.2d
1045 (3d Cir. 1980}; Bums v. Board of School Comm'rs, 437 F.2d 1143 (7th Cir. 1971). The Eleventh Circuit, however, persisted in allowing white employees to bring collateral attacks against affirmative action consent decrees when it had occasion to consider the issue in the case of In re
Birmingham Reverse Discrimination Employment Litigation, 833 F.2d 1492 (11th Cir. 1987),
known in its Supreme Court posture as Martin v. Wilks .
13. By limiting the majority employees, the courts superimposed on the majority employees'
right to challenge the time limitations contained in Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
pertaining to intervention. Kramer, supra note l, at 332.
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suant to a decree, 14 whereas others barred only challengers who had had
an opportunity to intervene in the original suit. 15 Some courts barred
only those seeking modification of the decree, whereas others forbade any
collateral suit, whether seeking to affect the decree's terms or simply
seeking damages for injuries resulting from implementation of the
decree. 16
The common law bar did not wholly eliminate challenges to consent
decrees, but simply restricted the form and timing of those challenges. It
barred only challenges raised in suits collateral to the original minority
law suit, leaving the majority employees free to intervene in the original
suit and to raise their challenges there. 17 Thus, the bar did not necessarily deprive majority employees of their day in court, but instead limited
the timing and venue of their challenge.
The courts adopted the collateral attack doctrine in order to further
the goal of finality, 18 to avoid inconsistent judgments, 19 and to encourage
consent decree resolutions to litigation. 20 The special need to bind nonparty majority employees by precluding their challenges to consent decrees grew out of the very nature of consent decrees and of the
discrimination suits that they resolve. 21 Settlement of this type of case is
very likely to give rise to third-party challenges; third-party challanges
can, m tum, be particularly devastating for the parties in this type of
case.
14. Thaggard, 681 F.2d at 69.
15. Observers and courts disagree on whether foregoing an opportunity to intervene in the
original suit was a prerequisite to the doctrine's application. Compare Martin v. Wilks, 490 U .S.
755, 762-66 (1989) and Kramer, supra note 1, at 322 (suggesting opportunity to intervene is a prerequisite) with U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON
CIVIL RIGHTS ON THE CIVIL RIGHTS Acr OF 1990 58 (July 1990) (suggesting bar was absolute
regardless of opportunity to intervene). Chief Justice Rehnquist, in Wilks, treated the doctrine as
barring only those employees who had had an opportunity to intervene. Wilks, 490 U.S. at 762-66;
see also Marino, 806 F.2d at 1146; Dennison, 658 F.2d at 696; Prate v. Freedman, 430 F. Supp. 1373,
1375 (W.D.N .Y.), a.ff'd sub nom. Zavaglia v. Freedman, 573 F.2d 1300 (2d Cir. 1977). Commentators have questioned the constitutionality of binding those who have not had such an opportunity.
See, e.g., Recktenwald, supra note 11, at 163-64.
16. See Dennison, 658 F.2d at 694-95; Kramer, supra note 1, at 333.
17. For the sake of consistency of judgments, it is crucial that challenges do take place in the
decree suit, rather than in an independent suit. The court in the decree suit can modify the decree to
obviate any legal infirmity the majority employees have disclosed, whereas a court managing a separate lawsuit could do little more than order the employer to violate the decree or pay damages to the
majority employees-not always an adequate remedy. See United States v. City of Chicago, 870
F .2d 1256, 1262 (7th Cir. 1989).
18. Marino, 806 F.2d at 1146; Thaggard, 687 F.2d at 69. The doctrine did not infringe upon
the right of parties and absentees to seek modification of consent decrees pursuant to changed conditions. See United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 114-15 (1932).
19. Marino, 806 F .2d at 1146.
20. In re Birmingham Reverse Discrimination Employment Litig., 833 F.2d 1492, 1498 (11th
Cir. 1987); Marino , 806 F .2d at 1146; Thaggard, 681 F .2d at 69. Courts have recognized a strong
preference for voluntary settlement of Title VII cases. See Firefighters v. Cleveland, 478 U .S. 501,
515 (1986); Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974); Thaggard , 681 F.2d at 69; see
also Schwarzschild, supra note 1, at 894-95; Recktenwald, supra note II, at 148-51.
21. See Douglas Laycock, Consent Decrees Without Consent: The Rights of Nonconsenting
Third Parties, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 103, 105-10.
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Any time affirmative action comes into play, there is a chance that
majority employees will be disadvantaged: affirmative action plans often
take away from the majority whatever advantages the plans are reserving
for the minority. 22 Reverse discrimination lawsuits, therefore, are always
a possibility. 23 At the same time, much employment discrimination litigation entails broad institutional challenges, resulting in affirmative action plans that are, in tum, also broad and institutionwide.
Implementation of such plans involves tremendous institutional adjustment and expense. 24 Thus, when the majority employees bring a suit to
challenge a plan so costly to put into place, courts and employers-to say
nothing of the benefited minorities-may have good reason to balk at the
idea of having to dismantle their affirmative action handiwork.
These considerations explain why a majority of circuit courts approved the impermissible collateral attack doctrine. The same considerations did not persuade the Supreme Court, however, which invalidated
the doctrine in 1989 in Martin v. Wilks. In that case, the Court held that
majority employees indeed may bring a subsequent collateral suit to challenge an affirmative action consent decree. 25
B.

Martin v. Wilks

In Martin v. Wilks, minority employees of the city of Birmingham,
Alabama, brought suit against Birmingham, alleging Title VII violations
with respect to that city's hiring and promotion practices. 26 To resolve
this litigation, the parties proposed two consent decrees, each including
affirmative action goals for the hiring and promotion of black firefighters.
The district court scheduled fairness hearings 27 and gave public notice
regarding the consent decrees. At the fairness hearings, the Birmingham
Firefighters Association (BFA), a union that was not a party to the suit,
filed objections to the decrees. After the conclusion of the hearings, but
before approval of the decrees, the BFA and two individual firefighters
moved to intervene, contending that the decrees would affect their rights
adversely. The district court rejected these motions as untimely 28 and
gave final approval of the decrees. Additional firefighters subsequently
sued for preliminary injunctive relief to forestall implementation of the
22. See Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 398-99 (1982).
23. It is, by now, well established that Title VII permits race discrimination suits by whites.
See McDonald v. Sante Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 286-87 (1976).
24. See, e.g., Cindy Vreeland, Public Interest Groups, Public Law Litigation, and Federal Rule
24(a), 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 279, 280 (1990) (citing William Burnham, Aspirational and Existential
Interests of Social Reform Organizations: A New Role for the Ideological Plaintiff, 20 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 153, 153 (1985)).
25. Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762-63 (1989).
26. The Jefferson County Personnel Board was joined as a defendant. /d. at 758. The joint
defendants are hereinafter referred to as "the City."
27. See infra notes 214-70 and accompanying text for a discussion of the role of the fairness
hearing in courts' consideration of consent decrees.
28. See discussion infra notes 123-65 and accompanying text (intervention timeliness
requirements).
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consent decrees, but the district court denied the relief requested.29
After the Eleventh Circuit affirmed these rulings, several white employees, including Robert Wilks, brought a separate reverse discrimination suit against the city, claiming that the consent decrees discriminated
against them in violation of federal law. 30 The district court rejected
these arguments, applying what was in essence the impermissible collateral attack doctrine. Although the city admitted making race-conscious
decisions, the district court ruled that the consent decrees were an absolute defense to the white employees' challenges as long as the consent
decrees truly required the city's actions. 31 The trial court found that the
decrees indeed did require the city's actions and dismissed the majority
employees' suit. The Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that the consent
decrees did not preclude Wilks's claim because he was neither a party to
the suit in which the decrees were entered nor in privity with a party to
that suit. Rejecting the impermissible collateral attack doctrine, the
court of appeals concluded that the public policy encouraging voluntary
affirmative action programs had to "yield to the policy against requiring
third parties to submit to bargains in which their interests were either
ignored or sacrificed." 32
The Supreme Court affirmed the Eleventh Circuit. Like the Eleventh Circuit, the Supreme Court rejected the collateral attack doctrine,
finding that it impermissibly bound non parties to the suit. 33 Writing for
the Court, 34 Chief Justice Rehnquist specifically rejected what he called
the "linchpin" of the doctrine: the idea that, by failing to intervene in the
first suit, the white employees had rendered themselves bound by the
consent decree. 35 Instead, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote, in cases in
which the minority employees hope to bind absentees, such as the whites
there in question, the absentees do not have the burden of seeking intervention in the original suit. 36 Rather, those already parties to the suit
29. Both the two individual firefighters who protested at the fairness hearing and these plaintiffs in the second suit were members of the Birmingham Firefighters Association.
30. In re Birmingham Reverse Discrimination Employment Litig., 833 F.2d 1492 (lith Cir.
1987), aff'd sub nom. Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989).
31. /d. at 1496-97. The primary issue in an intentional race discrimination suit is whether the
employment decision at issue was based on race, rather than on some other factor. See Goodman v.
Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 664-65 ( 1987). This issue clearly had to be resolved in favor of the
majority employees in Wilks because it was entirely due to the employees' races that some were
advantaged and some disadvantaged by the affirmative action plan. The court treated the affirmative
action plan as an affirmative defense, available to a defendant who admittedly had discriminated.
The Court then held a trial to resolve the issue of whether the decrees required the City's actions.
32. Birmingham, 833 F.2d at 1498.
33. This res judicata aspect of the court's opinion actually forms only a very small part of the
court's rationale. Assessing to what extent res judicata principles are intended to form a major
premise of the opinion is difficult. In this brief part of his opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist did echo
the position he had taken in Ashley v. City of Jackson, 464 U.S. 900 (1983), in which he argued that
the collateral attack doctrine violated due process. See id. at 901-02.
34. Justices White, O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy joined in Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun joined in Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion.
35. Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 765 (1989).
36. Part of Chief Justice Rehnquist's rationale on this point was that those present in the suit
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must invoke Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to obtain
joinder of the absentees as necessary parties. 37
There is a certain irony to the Wilks rationale. In the process of
striking down the collateral attack bar, the opinion suggests that joinder
under Rule 19 will accomplish the ends previously achieved by the impermissible collateral attack doctrine's mandatory intervention system.
Yet, Rule 19 does not achieve that doctrine's objectives of finality and
completeness of judgments in cases such as Wilks, where the minorities'
suit ends in a consent decree. On the contrary, even if the majority employees in Wilks had been joined under Rule 19, as the Chief Justice's
opinion advocates, they would not have been bound by any resultant
consent decree38 because of the Supreme Court's 1986 holding in Local
93, International Association ofFirefighters v. City of Cleveland (hereinafter Firefighters). 39
C

Firefighters v. City of Cleveland

The import of Wilks can be understood only in the light of Firefighters. Firefighters places Wilks in important historical context, for
Firefighters thematically foreshadows the Wilks decision. Firefighters, in
effect, demonstrates that Wilks forms part of a trend in Supreme Court.
doctrine and is not an isolated event.
In Firefighters, majority employees successfully intervened in a suit
are in a better position to predict likely consequences of the suit, and thus to know whose interests
are most likely to be affected. /d. It has been argued in response to this position that, if indeed the
parties are in a position to know better than the absentees whose interests will be affected, then the
parties may supply the benefit of that knowledge by being required to provide notice to the absentees,
rather than by having to join them. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 15, at 61.
37. Wilks, 490 U.S. at 765. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote: "Joinder as a party, rather than
knowledge of a lawsuit and an opportunity to intervene, is the method by which potential parties are
subjected to the jurisdiction of the court and bound by a judgment or decree." /d. The Court found
the mandatory intervention aspect of the impermissible collateral attack doctrine to be inconsistent
with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure scheme, which permits, but does not require, intervention.
/d. at 765-66. As is discussed infra at note 166, Rule 19 envisions two categories of absentees who
must be joined: "necesSa.ry" and "indispensable" parties. One does not always know (at what is
usually thought of as the joinder stage of litigation) whether a case will be resolved by consent decree
or by trial. Because Rule 19 is available as a joinder mechanism up until, and even during, trial,
thinking about cases as "consent decree cases" for purposes of this joinder mechanism is possible.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 19 advisory committee's notes, 1966 amends.
38. Of course, the majority employees would not be bound if joined as intervenors either. The
difference between intervention and Rule 19 in this context lies in what results if there is a failure to
join the majority employees under the two regimes. Under the impermissible collateral attack doctrine, if the majority employees fail to intervene, they are bound. Under the Rule 19 joinder rule, the
parties' failure to join the majority employees renders those employees not bound by the consent
decree. Chief Justice Rehnquist's decision does not propose to decide what result application of the
Rule 19 criteria should yield. Rather, he decides only that the parties to the case bear the burden of
seeking the absentees' joinder. But see George M. Strickler, Martin v. Wilks, 64 TuL. L. REv. 1557,
1605 (1990). The decree would bind these joined majority employees only if they decided they
wanted to be bound by the decree and actually joined in requesting the decree. There is often no
reason to believe that majority employees with nothing to gain would gratuitously relinquish their
employment rights by joining in a consent decree.
39. 478 u.s. 501 (1986).
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brought by minority employees charging Title VII violations.40 When
the minority employees and their employer repeatedly sought to resolve
their dispute with a consent decree, the intervenors adamantly objected
to the court's entry of the decree. 41 The trial court became extensively
involved in the settlement process. The court held two fairness hearings,
proposed its own alternative plans, and sponsored extensive negotiations
by the parties under the supervision of a federal magistrate. 42 The intervenors persisted in their objections, however, and, when the court entered the decree over those objections, appealed entry of the decree. 43
The intervenors based their appeal in large part on the argument
that the trial court was without power to enter the decree over the intervenors' objections.44 On this issue, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower
court's holding: the intervenors were powerless to prevent the district
court from entering an affirmative action consent decree agreed to by the
other two parties in the case. 45 By the same token, however, the Court
stated that the consent decree entered by the district court could not
dispose of the nonconsenting intervenors' claims that the decree was unlawful.46 The majority employees could not be bound by the decree, and
their claims remained to be litigated fully. Firefighters thus established a
theme and premise upon which the Court acted again in Wilks two years
later: the interests of finality and certainty in the consent decree context
40. /d.
41. /d. at 509.
42. /d. at 508-11.
43. The majority employees' primary objection centered on the fact that the court's approval of
that agreement-in the form of a decree-would have had the effect of ordering relief to nonvictims
of discrimination. The majority employees argued that award of relief to non victims would violate
§ 706(g) of Title VII. /d. at 513-14. Section 706(g) forbids courts from ordering reinstatement and
other relief if the adverse employment action is due to something other than discrimination. On the
same day the Court decided Firefighters, but in a different case, the Supreme Court rejected the
premise that courts may never award Title VII relief that benefits individuals who were not actual
victims of discrimination. Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421
(1986). The Court did not need to decide whether Firefighters was an appropriate case for the award
of such relief, however, because it found that a consent decree does not constitute an "order" for
purposes of§ 706(g). Firefighters, 478 U.S. at 521 . In order to conclude that a consent decree is not
a § 706(g) order, the Court had to consider how consent decrees differ from adjudicated orders in the
Title VII context. Most importantly, the Court found that consent decrees are voluntary and
§ 706(g) orders are coercive. /d. at 519-23. The Court found that whatever limits§ 706(g) imposes
on affirmative relief are entirely inapplicable to consent decrees. The decision in Firefighters signifies
that a federal court may enter an affirmative action consent decree regardless of the fact that the
same court would be powerless under Title VII to order the particular affirmative action upon adjudication of the Title VII claim.
44. /d. at 528.
45. Id. at 529 (citing Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 392, 400 (1982); Kirkland v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Serv., 711 F.2d 1117, 1126 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
465 U.S. 1005 (1984)). The intervenors, of course, might have persuaded the Court that it should
not enter the decree. They, in fact, attempted to do so at the fairness hearing, but failed. Once they
had failed in their efforts to persuade the Court, the intervenors could not then assert a veto power
over the entry of the decree despite that failure.
46. /d. The Court expressed the view, however, that it may have been too late, by the time the
case reached the Supreme Court, for the whites to raise any substantive challenges to the decree.
This view must have depended largely on the fact that the intervenors failed to assert any claim or
defense in their "Complaint of Applicant for Intervention." /d. at 507.
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must bow to the interests of majority employees in having their day in
court. 47 The demise of the impermissible collateral attack doctrine in
Wilks came as no surprise, for in Firefighters the Court already had
made inroads into the doctrine. In Firefighters, the majority employees
protected from preclusion by the Court were actual parties to the suit, for
they had intervened and thus had some opportunity to present their
views. 48 If the Supreme Court was unwilling to bind those present in the
Firefighters suit, who had an opportunity to be heard, it was even less
likely that they would bind the Wilks absentees, who had not even joined
in the first suit.
Moreover, Firefighters makes it clear that the Wilks Rule 19 solution is a hollow one. Because of Firefighters, joinder of the majority employees in Wilks could not have supplanted the impermissible collateral
attack doctrine as a way to achieve finality of the Wilks decrees. 49 Even
after these majority employees had been joined, they would have remained free, under Firefighters, to reject any decree proposed by the
principal parties to the case. Having rejected such proposals, the joined
majority employees would have remained free under Firefighters to litigate in that or a subsequent suit their claim that the adopted consent
decree was unlawful. 50
Because of Firefighters, then, joinder of the majority employees
under Rule 19 does not solve the problem. 5 1 No joinder provision can
bind majority employees to a consent decree to which they do not consent. Rule 19 thus could not solve the finality problems that previously
had been solved by a doctrine which-rightly or wrongly-bound all
those who had failed to intervene in the case.
III.

A STATUTORY BAR TO UNRAVEL WILKS AND FIREFIGHTERS
A.

Section 108

Like so many of the Supreme Court's civil rights decisions of the
past decade, the Wilks and Firefighters cases met with a chilly reception
47. Firefighters also presented general guidelines for when courts presented with proposed consent decrees may enter them as court decrees. Such decrees must:
I) "spring from and serve to resolve a dispute within the court's subject-matter jurisdiction";
2) fall " 'within the general scope of the case made by the pleadings' "; and
3) "further the objectives of the law upon which the complaint was based."
/d. at 525 (quoting Pacific R.R. v. Ketchum, 101 U.S. 289, 297 (1880) and citing EEOC v. Safeway
Stores, Inc., 611 F.2d 795, 799 (lOth Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 952 (1980)).
48. See discussion infra note 162 and accompanying text (limited intervention).
49. The Court in Wilks acknowledged at the end of its opinion that Firefighters precludes
binding those who do not join in consent decrees. Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 768 (1989).
50. Built-in protection against collateral challenges sometimes exists in such cases because
some courts retain jurisdiction over consent decrees by orders requiring that all parties' challenges to
the decree be brought to that court. Intervenors thus may be forced to litigate their claims in the
original suit, rather than in an independent reverse discrimination suit. Principles of res judicata,
moreover, might require that the intervenor raise its claim in the original suit or lose it.
51. Intervention, of course, would not bind the unconsenting absentees to the terms of the
decree either. Only their failure to seek intervention would bind them.
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in Congress. In both the I 0 I st and I 02d Congresses, Congress responded with legislation. In the vetoed Civil Rights Act of 1990, 52 Congress made its first attempt to reactivate the employment rights recently
curtailed by the Supreme Court. Congress sought in section 6 of the
1990 Act to revive the impermissible collateral attack doctrine by enacting it as statutory law. 53 Following a veto of the 1990 Act, Congress
succeeded, in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, in overruling Wilks legislatively. The 1991 version of the legislation is similar, but not identical, to
the pertinent provision in the 1990 version. 54
Section 108 of the 1991 Act bars two categories of employees from
bringing separate reverse-discrimination suits to challenge affirmative action plans arising out of employment discrimination cases:
Category 1 bars those with sufficient notice and an opportunity
to object at the time the decree or judgment was entered; and
Category 2 bars those whose interests were sufficiently represented in the original suit by a person who challenged the decree or
judgment. 55
By barring collateral attacks, section 108 amounts to a complete reversal of the Wilks case. For those courts that, prior to Wilks, would
52. Civil Rights Act of 1990, supra note 6. Section 6 of the vetoed bill reads:
(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, and except as provided in paragraph (2),

an employment practice that implements a litigated or consent judgment or order resolving a
claim of employment discrimination under the United States Constitution or Federal civil rights
laws may not be challenged in a claim under the United States Constitution or Federal civil
rights laws(A) by a person who, prior to the entry of such judgement or order, had(i) notice from any source of the proposed judgment or order sufficient to apprise such
person that such judgment or order might affect the interests of such person; and
(ii) a reasonable opportunity to present objections to such judgment or order;
(B) by a person with respect to whom the requirements of subparagraph (A) are not satisfied, if the court determines that the interests of such person were adequately represented by
another person who challenged such judgment or order prior to or after the entry of such
judgment or order; or
(C) if the court that entered the judgment or order determines that reasonable efforts were
made to provide notice to interested persons.
53. As an amendment to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the statutory recission of
Wilks (both the 1990 attempt and the 1991 enactment) revises the bar only in the employment
discrimination context. It does not affect the broader implications of Martin v. Wilks for institutional-reform litigation outside the Title VII context. See Strickler, supra note 38, at 1605.
54. Compare Civil Rights Act of 1990, supra note 6 (binding those persons without actual
notice when court found reasonable efforts to give notice had been made) with Pub. L. No. 102-166,
sec. 108, 105 Stat. 1071, 1076-77 (Nov. 21, 1991) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2) (omitting
the bar of persons without actual notice).
55. A third category under the 1990 Act would have included those without actual notice of
the suit if the court determined before entering the decree or judgment that reasonable efforts had
been made to give notice to interested people.
(C) if the court that entered the judgment or order determines that reasonable efforts were
made to provide notice to interested persons. A determination under subparagraph (C) shall be
made prior to the entry of the judgment or order, except that if the judgment or order was
entered prior to the date of the enactment of this subsection, the determination may be made at
any reasonable time.
With regard to this third category, the 1990 Act stated without specifying procedures, that the
notice should be consistent with the "constitutional requirements" of due process. Civil Rights Act
of 1990, supra note 6.
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have barred only majority employees who had declined an opportunity to
intervene, 56 section 108 expands the doctrine. Under section 108, employees who received no notice of the original suit, and thus had no opportunity to intervene, but whose interests were adequately represented
by people in the first suit are barred under Category 2. 57
The Act also expands the bar to judgments, in addition to consent
decrees. Section 108 states that "an employment practice that implements and is within the scope of a litigated or consent judgment or order
that resolves a claim of employment discrimination under the Constitution or Federal civil rights laws may not be challenged" by the two categories of potential plaintiffs described above. Thus, employees cannot
collaterally challenge any employment practice put in place as a result of
litigation, whether the practice was agreed to in a consent decree or ordered by the court pursuant to a trial. The expansion of the doctrine to
encompass judgments may have no effect on analysis of the doctrine's
constitutionality. In his dissent to denial of certiorari in Ashley v. City of
Jackson, then Associate Justice Rehnquist suggested that binding an absentee by a judgment is less harmful than binding by a decree, because
the former is at least based upon objective adjudication by the court,
while the latter "is little more than a contract between the parties." 58
There is reason to believe that section 108 would pass muster with
the Chief Justice, who drafted the Wilks opinion, in which the common
law version of the bar failed. The Wilks decision rested principally upon
an apparent conflict between the collateral attack bar and the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, rather than upon any conflict between the bar
and the Due Process Clause. Although the Chief Justice began the Wilks
discussion with a due process reference, he devoted most of his opinion
to arguing that the impermissible collateral attack doctrine was inconsistent with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24, governing intervention, because the judicial doctrine required intervention, whereas the rule
rendered intervention voluntary. 59 In fact, because the Wilks opinion
actually finds significance in the absence of a legislative scheme to bind
absentees, the opinion appears to invite the adoption of such a scheme in
this context. Yet, the absence of any thorough due process analysis of
the bar in Wilks leaves open the threat that the Supreme Court is reserving its due process arsenal for review of the statutory bar that was likely
to be, and has now been, enacted in the wake of Wilks. 60 If the Court
had fully addressed due process problems in the judicial bar, Congress
56. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
51. In addition, majority employees who received no notice and whose interests were not represented are barred under Category 3 as long as constitutionally sufficient, albeit unsuccessful, efforts
at notice had been made.
58. Ashley v. City of Jackson, 464 U.S. 900, 902 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
59. See Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 763-67 (1989).
60. Chief Justice Rehnquist, in proffering the idea that a legislatively enacted bar would comport with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, cautioned that such a legislative scheme would come
under the Court's due process scrutiny. Wilks, 490 U.S. at 762 n.2. The issue received more thor-
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might have tailored any responsive legislation to avoid the identified due
process pitfalls. As it is, the Supreme Court left itself a broad berth in
this area when it decided Wilks.
B.

The Statutory Bar's Constitutionality

If the statutory bar is unconstitutional, it is because those who were

neither parties to a lawsuit nor in privity with the parties to the suit
cannot as a rule be bound by the resulting judgment consistently with
due process. 61 There are, however, notable exceptions to this fundamental res judicata principle. 62 These exceptions come into play when factors other than the nonparties' presence and participation in the lawsuit
assuage due process concerns and when interests in finality surmount the
interest in guarding against any remaining threats to due process. 63 Of
the exceptions recognized at common law, the one relevant here is the
exception for absentees who were adequately represented by a party.64
ough treatment in Justice Rehnquist's 1983 opinion dissenting from denial of certiorari in Ashley,
464 U.S. at 900 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
61. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 327 n.7 (1979); see also Mann v. City of
Albany, 883 F.2d 999, 1003 (lith Cir. 1989); United States v. City of Chicago, 870 F.2d 1256, 1260
(7th Cir. 1989) (citing Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433, 438 (1940)); Insurance Co. of North Am. v.
Bay, 784 F.2d 869, 873 (8th Cir. 1986); In re Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R., 738 F.2d
209, 213 (7th Cir. 1984). Res judicata-consisting of claim preclusion and issue preclusion-does
preclude those who are parties to the consent decree from challenging the decree. Firefighters v.
City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 522 (1986); United States v. Armour & Co., 402 U.S. 673, 681-82
(1971). As a general principle, "'one is not bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in
which he is not designated as a party or to which he has not been made a party by service of
process.'" Wilks , 490 U.S. at 761 (quoting Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940)); see, e.g.,
Parklane Hosiery Co., 439 U.S. at 327 n.7. The crucial underpinning for the Court's decision in
Wilks was that "a judgment or decree among parties to a lawsuit resolves issues as among them, but
it does not conclude the rights of strangers to those proceedings.'' Wilks, 490 U.S. at 762. This
principle derives from the due process requirement that a person subjected to a threat of loss be
given notice of the case against him and a meaningful opportunity to present his position. See
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
62. Sometimes due process is deemed satisfied even when the minimums of notice and opportunity to be heard are not met. "Because protection of this opportunity [to litigate] is a matter of
Constitutional right, [see, e.g., Blonder-Tongue Lab., Inc. v. University of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313
{1971); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969), rev'd, 401 U.S. 321
(1971)], the exceptions to the general rule are carefully defined." FLEMING JAMES, JR. & GEOFFREY
C. HAZARD, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE§ 11.22, at 629 (3d ed. 1985). See infra note 64 for a listing of
these exceptions.
63. See Thaggard v. City of Jackson, 687 F.2d 66, 69 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
1003 (1983).
64. The common law recognizes three broad categories of persons who are excepted from the
rule against binding absentees. The first category consists of those who have been represented by a
party to the suit. This exception "has its roots in a few limited classes of relationships, involving, for
example, '[t]rustees, executors, statutory representatives in death and survival actions, and guardians.'" 18 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE§ 4448, at 408 (2d
ed. 1987). The Court has extended this category of exceptions to apply to class actions, see Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940), and litigation undertaken by collective bargaining representatives.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS§ 61, at 117-18 (1980). The second category encompasses those standing in a legal relationship with a party such that it is fair to bind the absentee. /d.
§ 62, at 125. This category includes those in privity with a party. The third category of nonparties
who may be bound includes nonparties who controlled a party's conduct in the original litigation to
such an extent that it is fair to treat the nonparty as if he had been a party. 18 WRIGHT ET AL.,
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The inquiry with respect to the section 108 bar is whether it fits within
this exception to due process limitations on preclusion. It might be asked
at the outset why due process protections are even necessary when courts
preclude white employees from challenging consent decrees. The argument has been made that what is happening here is not truly "preclusion, anyway. Rather, it is argued, a judgment or decree can have a
practical effect on one's interests without having a res judicata effect on
any legal claim. 65 This was, in fact, one of the premises underlying Justice Stevens's dissent in Martin v. Wilks. Justice Stevens concluded that
no res judicata effect was occurring in Wilks because there was only an
indirect effect on the interests of majority employees. 66 Justice Stevens
supra,§ 4451, at 427-28. Only the first of these three exceptions (encompassing those whose interests were adequately represented in the original suit) is relevant to sec. 108, and then only relevant to
Category 2. In addition, courts make exceptions for certain absentees as to whom "reasonable"
efforts at notice have been made under the Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust principle. Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950) (notice by publication to unknown beneficiaries is sufficient).
65. JAMES & HAZARD, supra note 62, § 11.22, at 630. This means that absentees, though not
legally bound by the consent decree, may be affected by the decree by, for example, practical changes
at the workplace that may have the effect of eliminating or altering their prospects for promotions,
hiring, pay raises, etc. In his dissent in Wilks, Justice Stevens made reference to the "practical
effect" of judgments, stating, "[t]he fact that one of the effects of a decree is to curtail the job opportunities of nonparties does not mean that the nonparties have been deprived of legal rights or that
they have standing to appeal from that [consent] decree without becoming parties." Martin v.
Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 771 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting). These effects on the nonparty are not the
result of res judicata rules as such. They are the result of the fact that a judgment not only determines issues and claims but also may redefine the relationships of the parties to the litigation with
respect to each other, with respect to property, and with respect to their future courses of conduct.
It is suggested that the judgment thus operates much like a privately negotiated contract or conveyance as far as nonparties are concerned. JAMES & HAZARD, supra note 62, § 11.23, at 631.
The Mullane case discussed below, see infra notes 79-82 and accompanying text, actually distinguishes between those who are named parties to the suit, thus requiring personal notice, and those
whose interests are impaired though they are not named as parties. The level of notice required for
these two categories may differ, but both groups deserve some protection under the Due Process
Clause.
66. Justice Stevens states that the decree does not bind absentees but only affects them, and
draws analogy to the issuance of a valid search warrant serving as evidence of good faith. Thus,
Justice Stevens equates the decree's effect in the Wilks case to a "good faith" argument. In fact,
however, all the "good faith" in the world will not excuse an employer who is choosing people for
promotions based on their races. The very fact that race is the characteristic used to select a
promotee is enough to amount to a Title VII violation. And the presence of benign motives normally will not take such an employer decision outside the reach of Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000
(1988). See Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656 (1987). Defenses are available to employers
who are caught basing decisions on race, but "good faith" is not one of them. Nevertheless, Justice
Stevens writes that what matters here is that the employer had good reason for its decision-the
consent decree. To have a "good reason" in the disparate treatment context means to have a reason
other than race, not an excuse for using race as the reason.
Justice Stevens found that the true basis for the lower court's opinion was that the court had
found the City guilty of discrimination, establishing the Weber predicates for affirmative action. At
the close of the opinion, he actually wrote that, by virtue of the trial on discrimination issues, the
whites had had their day in court. It is difficult to understand why this should make any difference.
Even if the court had made a finding of fact that discrimination had occurred, that finding should
not have any impact on an absentee who is bringing a suit that puts that fact at issue. Only if it is
recognized that a collateral attack bar precludes the absentee's inde{lendent suit will the result of the
first suit have an impact on the absentee's suit. The idea that one cannot attack a consent decree,
Justice Stevens writes, was only an alternative holding: Justice Stevens writes that "(n]owhere in the
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actually agreed with Chief Justice Rehnquist that it would not be permissible to bind an absentee in the res judicata sense, but argued that what
was happening in Wilks was not preclusion. As discussed below, however, and despite Justice Stevens's protestations to the contrary, the effect
of barring a subsequent majority suit is preclusive in nature, requiring
due process protections.
Justice Stevens suggested that "[t]he fact that one of the effects of a
decree is to curtail the job opportunities of nonparties does not mean that
the nonparties have been deprived of legal rights."67 This is correct because curtailment of majority employees' job opportunities is an inevitable and legitimate result of many affirmative action consent decrees. 68
What the majority employees sought to challenge in Wilks, however, was
not the legitimate "curtailment of job opportunities," but rather an allegedly unlawful consent decree so violative of majority rights that the majority possessed a legal cause of action to challenge it. In Justice
Stevens's view, the consent decree could serve as a complete defense to an
action properly brought by majority employees to challenge the decree as
unlawful. 69 If a decree can so thwart a subsequent majority employee
suit, surely its effect must be termed "preclusive."70 If a bar is required,
then there must be a legal claim to bar. Barring those majority employees who possess causes of action constitutes real preclusion and an exception to the usual rule against precluding nonparties. Because the bar's
effect is indeed preclusive, it must be encompassed in an exception71 to
District Court's lengthy findings of fact and conclusions of law is there a single word suggesting that
respondents were bound by the consent decree." Wilks, 490 U.S. at 782 (Steven~. J., dissenting).
The effect of the lower court's decision was to preclude challenges to actions taken under the decree,
regardless of whether that was called "res judicata," "binding," or by some other designation.
67. Wilks, 490 U.S. at 771 (Stevens, J ., dissenting). In cases in which the nonparty has a
claim, the nonparty simply may bring the claim in a second suit and avoid the first judgment by
asserting that res judicata cannot bind a nonparty. Only when the nonparty lacks an assertible
claim, experiencing only a practical impairment of interest, is he limited, as Justice Stevens argues, to
asserting fraud or lack of jurisdiction in challenging the decree. /d. at 771-72 (Stevens, J ., dissenting); see JAMES & HAZARD, supra note 62, § 12.15, at 681. It has been argued that limitations on
collateral attacks do not apply in these situations because "[a]n attack by a nonparty is not collateral;
the nonparty did not have his day in court." United States v. City of Chicago, 870 F.2d 1256, 1262
(7th Cir. 1989); see also Kramer, supra note 1, at 332 (term "collateral attack" ordinarily refers to
party's attempt to avoid judgment rendered against that party in different action).
68. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
69. In fact, the nonparty majority employees in Wilks and similar cases do have a colorable
cause of action, which is to say the employees have alleged that their legal rights have been violated.
Specifically, the majority employees would allege, for example, that the employer promoted Jones
instead of Smith because Jones was black and Smith was white. This states a cause of action under
Title VII and the Constitution. See McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp., 427 U.S. 273 (1976). In
this context, then, the binding effect of the decree is not only practical, it is also legal.
70. George M. Strickler, Jr., in an article entitled "Martin v. Wilks," has reached a similar
conclusion. Strickler, supra note 38, at 1575.
71. It may be argued that such exceptions to the rules of res judicata are strictly an area for
legislative prerogative. The judicial collateral attack bar has been criticized as judicial legislating.
See Wilks, 490 U.S. at 762 n.2 (citing NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 529-30 n.lO
(1984)). It has also been argued that any scheme designed to bind absentees by giving them notice
consistent with Mullane need not necessarily be enacted legislatively, but may instead be created as
judicial doctrine. Strickler, supra note 38, at 1604-05. But see Kramer, supra note 1, at 335. In
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the res judicata principle that protects the due process rights of those
barred. Under such due process scrutiny, the preclusion in section 108 is
straightforward and fair. 72
The first section 108 category embodies the old judicial collateral
attack bar in its purest form. Notice has been given to the absentee majority employees in such a way that they have had a meaningful opportunity to intervene or otherwise present their objections. 73 Given that the
bar here is limited to those afforded these protections, this portion of
section 108 should easily pass constitutional muster. 74 The bar does not
keep the majority employees from having their day in court, but only sets
the date for their appearance. As one commentator has stated, "allowing
a party to be heard on the merits only if he satisfies [the Rule 24 intervention] requirements does not deprive that party of due process" any more
than imposition of a statute of limitations does. 75
The second section 108 category, which binds absentees whose interests were adequately represented by those present in the suit, reflects an
area of constitutionally permissible preclusion under the Supreme Court
case of Hansberry v. Lee. 76 Category 2 preclusion has the same effect as
Mullane, the reasonable notice attempts, which the Court deemed capable under due process of
binding absentees, were made pursuant to statutory authorization. This factor may well have signifi·
cance, for states' interests, expressed legislatively, have, over the years, played an increasing role in
due process analysis in related areas. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102
(1987); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); Helicopteros Nationales de Colombia
v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984). But see Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). Professor Strickler
cites the case of Roffman-La Roche v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165 (1989), for the contrary proposition.
Although it is true that the Supreme Court, in Sperling, upheld the power of federal courts to authorize notice to absent class members, Sperling was not a case in which a court sought to bind such
absentees solely by virtue of the court+directed notice. /d. Thus, despite Sperling, fashioning a bar
predicated upon Mullane notice may be beyond the power of the courts. The Supreme Court has
struck down the judicial collateral attack bar as beyond the scope of permissible preclusion, so any
judicial activity to recreate the bar would need to emanate from the Supreme Court.
72. The third category under the vetoed 1990 Act, persons without notice, but as to whom
notice efforts were made, was more troubling, but courts could have construed it to achieve due
process as well.
73. See Marino v. Ortiz, 806 F.2d 1144, 1146 (2d Cir. 1986), aff'd by an equally divided court,
484 U.S. 301 (1988). The constitutionality of binding absentees based on their receipt of notice and
an unexercised opportunity to intervene has been the subject of discussion by commentators.
Charles J. Cooper, The Collateral Attack Doctrine and the Rules of Intervention: A Judicial Pincer
Movement on Due Process, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 155, 171 (presuming consistency with due process by analogy to statutes of limitation); see also Civil Rights Act of 1990: Hearings on S. 2104
Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 553-54 (1990)
[hereinafter Senate Hearings] (statement of Prof. Laurence H. Tribe, Tyler Professor of Constitutional Law, Harvard University Law School).
74. "[T]here is no fundamental unfairness in precluding post-hoc challenges by individuals
who had actual notice that their interests might be adversely affected and an opportunity to make
those challenges at the time of the litigation." Senate Hearings, supra note 73, at 554 (statement of
Prof. Laurence Tribe); see Kramer, supra note I, at 340-41 (opportunity to intervene is constitutionally sufficient "opportunity to be heard").
75. Kramer, supra note 1, at 339. But see Recktenwald, supra note 11, at 179. "[T]he only
prerequisite of estopping someone in this situation is the existence of procedures comporting with
due process-that is actual notice and an opportunity to be heard." Senate Hearings, supra note 73,
at 556 (statement of Prof. Laurence Tribe).
76. 311 U.S. 32 (1940). Courts already have treated adequate representation as an adequate
ground to bar absentees from raising challenges to a decree. In Bolden v. Pennsylvania State Police,

60

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 1992

that of Rules 23(b)(1) and 23(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which bind absent, unnotified class members whose interests have
been protected by a class representative. If these portions of Rule 23 are
constitutional, then so is the Category 2 bar. 77 The courts have been
deemed qualified to assess adequacy of representation in the Rule 23 context and should be equally competent in the section 108 context. 78
Drafters of the 1991 Act succeeded in ridding the legislation of a
1990 provision that most likely would have subjected the legislation to
constitutional challenge. The third category of preclusion under the
1990 Act would have bound employees who neither received notice nor
(presumably) were adequately represented, but as to whom adequate efforts at notice had been made. To read the category as it was written,
however, to bind those who neither received notice nor were adequately
represented, might have violated the constitutional principles set forth in
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust. 19
In Mullane, the Supreme Court set forth the constitutional standard
for binding persons who had not received actual notice of a suit. The
Court indicated that a "reasonable-under-the-circumstances" test should
govern the notice issue. The Mullane Court went on to hold that notice
by publication represented a constitutionally sufficient effort at notice
even to bind unidentified absentees not actually reached by the notice in
that case. So far, this sounds consistent with the Category 3 scenario.
One part of the Mullane Court's rationale, however, was that a trustee
had appeared in the suit on behalf of the unidentified absentees in that
case and had adequately represented their interests. 80 Thus, the Mullane
578 F.2d 912 (3d Cir. 1978), the court looked at the question of whether some majority employees
could intervene to challenge a consent decree. Separate suits already had been rejected as impermissible collater::ll challenges. ld. at 917. The court looked at the question of whether the absentees had
been represented adequately separately from the Rule 24 issue of adequacy of representation. I d. at
918-19. The court apparently viewed the absentees as bound in the res judicata sense solely because
their interests had been adequately represented. The fact that a party has
champion[ed] the position asserted by another in a subsequent action is a factor to consider in
determining whether the later party is a privy of the earlier party, Aerojet-General Corp. v.
Askew, 511 F.2d 710,719 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 908 (1975), but this factor alone has
never been considered sufficient to warrant denying the later party his day in court [under res
judicata principles] . . ..
Mann v. City of Albany, 883 F.2d 999, 1003 (lith Cir. 1989) (citing 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note
64, § 4457, at 495).
77. See Senate Hearings, supra note 73, at 558-59 (statement of Prof. Laurence Tribe).
78. See FED. R. Ctv. P. 23 advisory committee's notes, 1966 amends.
79. 339 U.S. 306 (1950). Mullane concerned the constitutional sufficiency of notice given to
trust beneficiaries in a case involving an accounting of trust assets. The Court held that what the
reasonableness standard requires depends on the facts. Of the three categories of interest in the
litigation, the Court held that
1) those whose names and addresses were known should be mailed notice, and not simply given
notice by publication;
2) those whose names and addresses were not known could be notified by publication; and
3) those who could not be identified but who potentially were interested could be notified by
publication-if even that was required.
ld. at 317-18.
80. /d. at 318-19.
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test may require both that reasonable effort has been made to notify the
absentees and that the interests of the absentees somehow have been protected in the originallitigation. 81
If Category 3's reference to "constitutional requirements" incorporated this construction of the Mullane standard, then Category 3
amounted to little more than a restatement and expansion of Category 2,
which requires adequate representation of the absentees in order for them
to be bound. If Category 3 had covered situations beyond those covered
by Category 2, then Category 3 would have reached unnotified persons
whose interests had not been represented adequately by parties in the
first suit. Such a result would have violated the construction of Mullane
described above by binding absentees who had absolutely no idea nor
reason to know that the original suit was under way and whose interests
were not represented before the court in that suit. 82 By barring these
would-be challengers who lacked notice and were unrepresented, 83 then,
the 1990 Act would have provided a ready target for constitutional
challenge.
81. In a statement to the Senate Committee considering § 6 of the 1990 bill, Professor Tribe
stated:
Where any efforts at notice would almost certainly be futile, Mullane may mean either that
those who could not possibly have been notified-e.g., generations yet unborn--<:annot possibly
be bound by the judgment or, far more plausibly, that such individuals may be bound so long as
it would not be fundamentally unfair to treat them as "represented" de facto by those who did
receive notice and made the relevant challenges.
Senate Hearings, supra note 73, at 557 (statement of Prof. Laurence Tribe).
Other aspects of Mullane appear to comport with the employment discrimination scenario
under discussion. For example, Mullane entailed special circumstances in which the state had an
interest in resolving certain trust matters with finality. Similarly, here, the federal interest in finality
of decrees and judgments effectuating Title VII is strong.
82. Such absentees might include individuals who were not employees at the time of the suit.
It may sometimes make sense to notify persons with pending job applications, and to certify
representatives of the class of all present and future job applicants who might be affected by the
quota. But status as an applicant for work with a particular employer is often short-lived, and
an applicant's stake with any particular employer is often small. The court can notify current
applicants, but it certainly cannot rely on them to represent a class. Current applicants arguably, and future applicants certainly, are like the remaindermen in Mullane. They do not have to
be notified individually, but if they are to be bound, the court must appoint a guardian ad litem
to represent their interests.
Laycock, supra note 21, at 148-49 (citing In re Century Brass Prods., Inc., 795 F.2d 265, 275 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 949 (1986); In re Amatex Corp., 755 F.2d 1034, 1043 (3d Cir. 1985),
a./f'd, 908 F.2d 961 (3d Cir. 1990)).
83. When the 1990 Act was pending before Congress, efforts to ameliorate these perceived
threats to due process resulted in a final hour amendment to§ 6 of the 1990 bill. This amendment
preserved the Category 1-3 preclusion, but limited such preclusion to those who seek to challenge
decrees entered before enactment of the 1990 Act and up to 30 days after its passage. The bar on
challenges to post-Act decrees would have been more limited. With one exception, the amendment
precluded challenges on post-Act decrees only by individuals who, prior to entry of the decree, were
employees, former employees, or applicants. For these categories of individuals, the prerequisites for
preclusion largely duplicated two of the three categories of preclusion for pre-Act decree challenges.
Thus, an employee with adequate notice of the decree could have been precluded, as could employees who received no notice where adequate efforts at notice had been made. The amendment actually would have enhanced protections for these challengers, for it specified the quality of notice the
would-be challenger had to have received.
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WHAT IS A COURT To Do? PROTECTING THE INTERESTS OF
MAJORITY EMPLOYEES

As enacted, the collateral attack bar seldom should operate to the
detriment of majority employees. By its terms, the Act limits the bar to
those majority employees whose interests are protected. Courts may,
with good reason, therefore find themselves focusing more on the problem of gaps in the statutory bar that will permit ongoing majority challenges to entered decrees than on any problems of fairness to the narrow
class of majority employees actually barred by the enacted provision.
The remainder of this article considers two very different types of mechanisms that can operate together to assure the finality of consent decrees
by safeguarding majority employees' interests. The first type includes
mechanisms that allow majority employees to become involved in the
original discrimination suit between the minority employees and the employer. These mechanisms-intervention and Rule 19 joinder-are both
governed by existing federal rules of civil procedure. Because of the Category 1 bar against those who have had an opportunity to be heard, the
article advocates a liberal interpretation of the intervention rules, consistent with existing precedent, to ease and encourage majority employee
involvement. By easing the majority employees' involvement in the first
suit, courts subsequently confronted with collateral challenges to the decree that resolves that suit can, in good conscience, impose the bar because those barred have had "a reasonable opportunity to present
objections to such judgment or order." 84 The article goes on to suggest
that application of Rule 19, by contrast, usually should result in nonjoinder. The second type of mechanism proposed in the article seeks to assure consent decree finality through modifications of the fairness hearing
preceding the court's entry of the decree. These modifications would ensure such careful scrutiny that majority employees not barred by section
l 08 will lack grounds to challenge the decree.
A.

Easing Majority Involvement in the Original Suit

The best way to avert collateral challenges to consent decrees is to
protect majority employees' interests by involving them or their representatives in the original suit. Two mechanisms for involving majority
employees are viable: one is intervention of right85 under Rule 24, and
84. Pub. L. No. 102-166, sec. 108, 105 Stat. 1071, 1076 (Nov. 21, 1991) (amending the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 § 703(n)(l)(B)(i)(II), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000h (1988)).
85. Rule 24(a) provides as follows:
(a) Intervention of Right. Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene
in an action: (I) when a statute of the United States confers an unconditional right to intervene;
or (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the
subject of the action and the applicant is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a
practical matter impair or impede the applicant's ability to protect that interest, unless the
applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties.
FED. R. CIV. P. 24(a). Rule 24(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides for permissive
intervention when the criteria for intervention of right are not met. FED. R. C1v. P. 24(b). The

No. 1]

SILENCED MAJORITY

63

the other is joinder as necessary or indispem~able parties under Rule 19. 86
By cutting off certain subsequent challenges to a decree, the statutory bar
presents potential for impact on the availability of both of these mechanisms. By making collateral challenges available to those not protected
in the decree suit, the bar also increases the importance of joining the
majority employees.

1.

Intervention Prospects Under Section 108
Category 1 of section 108 precludes challenges by employees who
have had notice and "a reasonable opportunity to ·present objections. " 87
Nonparties may receive such an opportunity by petitioning for intervention. Intervention is a procedural device that permits an outsider to seek

court has the power to grant permissive intervention as long as the applicant's claim or defense has a
question of law or fact in common with the main action. ld. The decision of whether to grant
permissive intervention is within the court's discretion. Because the majority employees appear to
have a clear right to intervene, this article does not consider application of Rule 24(b). If a court
were to find no intervention right, it should grant permissive intervention because of the likelihood
that prejudice to the majority employees will result in challenges to the decree. Cf. Ionian Shipping
Co. v. British Law Ins. Co., 426 F .2d 186, 191 (2d Cir. 1970).
86. Rule 19 provides in pertinent part as follows:
(a) Persons to Be Joined If Feasible. A person who is subject to service of process and
whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action
shall be joined as a party in the action if (1) in the person's absence complete relief cannot be
accorded among those already parties, or (2) the person claims an interest relating to the subject
of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in the person's absence may (i)
as a practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave
any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or
otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of the claimed interest. If the person has not been
so joined, the court shall order that the person be made a party. If the person should join as a
plaintiff but refuses to do so, the person may be made a defendant, or, in a proper case, an
involuntary plaintiff. If the joined party objects to venue and joinder of that party would render
the venue of the action improper, that party shall be dismissed from the action.
(b) Determination by Court Whenever Joinder Not Feasible. If a person as described in
subdivision (a)(l)-(2) hereof cannot be made a party, the court shall determine whether in equity and good conscience the action should proceed among the parties before it, or should be
dismissed, the absent person being. thus regarded as indispensable. The factors to be considered
by the court include: first, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's absence might be
prejudicial to the person or those already parties; second, the extent to which, by protective
provisions in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other measures, the prejudice can be
lessened or avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in the person's absence will be adequate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is dismissed for
nonjoinder.
FED. R. CJV. P. 19. Joinder under either Rule 19 or Rule 24 would qualify as an ..opportunity to be
heard" under Category 1 of sec.' 108. See supra text accompanying note 52. Professor Kramer has
argued that an appropriate mechanism for joining the absentees would be to permit them to file suits
and transfer those suits to the judge presiding over the minority suit, who could then consolidate the
cases. Kramer, supra note 1, at 335. When the bar against collateral attacks in the 1990 legislation
would have foreclosed this possibility, Professor Kramer advocated enactment of a provision of§ 6
(now contained in sec. 108 of the enacted statute) requiring that any collateral attacks permitted be
brought in front of the judge handling the minority suit and that such challenges be consolidated
with the minority suit to avoid duplication of effort. Joint Hearings on H.R. 4000, The Civil Rights
Act of 1990 Before the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor and the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 474-75 (1990) {hereinafter
House Hearings] (statement of Prof. Larry Kramer).
87. Courts may decide that the mere opportunity to petition for intervention constitutes ..a
reasonable opportunity t9 present objections" or may instead require that the majority employees
either appear informally at a fairness hearing or actually become parties.
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permission to join a lawsuit. 88 This device leaves the burden on the outsider to recognize that the suit may impair his interests. Once the outsider succeeds in intervening, he has the full rights and obligations of any
other party. 89
Absent the statutory bar, employees who could be affected adversely
by an affirmative action consent decree either may try to intervene or
may lodge a separate challenge in court after the decree is entered.90
Under the pre-Wilks judicial bar, courts frequently dismissed these post
hoc challenges as impermissible collateral attacks on the consent decree.
Courts rejecting such challenges often remarked that the challenger's
"proper course . . . would have been to intervene in the lawsuit from
which the consent decree issued." 91 Such statements may seem to suggest that intervention was a reliable method for obtaining access to the
proceedings leading up to a consent decree. Motions to intervene in such
cases, however, often were unsuccessful for failure to meet particular requirements imposed by Rule 24.92 Despite the failures of some majority
employees' efforts to intervene in the original minority suits, there were
times when the potential for imposition of the judicial collateral attack
bar itself enabled the majority employees to meet the Rule 24 require88. FED. R. Ctv. P. 24. Many consider intervention to be the better route for joinder of majority employees in employment discrimination suits. See Strickler, supra note 38, at 1592-98.
89. Kirkland v. New York Dep't of Correctional Servs., 711 F.2d 1117 (2d Cir. 1983), cert
denied, 465 U.S. 1005 (1984); 3B JAMES MOORE & JOHN E. KENNEDY, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE~ 24.16[1], at 24-155 (2d ed. 1991). Thus, if majority employees intervene (or are otherwise
joined) in a case that concludes in an adjudicated judgment, principles of res judicata will estop them
to the same extent as any other party. See Vreeland, supra note 24, at 308 n. l5l. Recall, however,
that a party (whether joined by intervention or otherwise) who does not join in a consent decree
cannot be bound thereby. Firefighters v. Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501 (1986).
90. Because decree-entering courts often retain jurisdiction to enforce compliance with the
decree, see, e.g., United States v. City of Chicago, 870 F.2d 1256, 1257 (7th Cir. 1989), employees
seeking to alter or enjoin the decree should seek intervention, and those seeking damages can obtain
what they want as easily through a separate suit. ld. at 1258.
91. Marino v. Ortiz, 806 F.2d 1144, 1146 (2d Cir. 1986) (citing Dennison v. City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power, 658 F.2d 694, 696 (9th Cir. 1981)), aff'd by an equally divided court,
484 U.S. 301 (1988); see also Thaggard v. City of Jackson, 687 F.2d 66, 68 (5th Cir. 1982), cert
denied , 464 U.S. 900 (1983); Black & White Children of the Pontiac Sch. Sys. v. School Dist., 464
F.2d 1030 (6th Cir. 1972). Cj Stritf v. Mason, 849 F.ld 240, 245 (6th Cir. 1988) (district court
should have permitted Stritf to intervene to present his claim).
92. Jones v. Caddo Parish Sch. Bd., 704 F .2d 206 (5th Cir. 1983); EEOC v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 675 F.2d 164 {8th Cir. 1982); Culbreath v. Dukakis, 630 F.2d 15 {1st Cir. 1980); United
States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., 553 F .2d 451 {5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 914 {1978).
In Ashley v. City of Jackson, 464 U.S. 900 (1983), Justice Rehnquist discussed the unfairness of
denying intervention on timeliness grounds when, as in that case, the parties' cause of action arose
from the consent decree, yet did not accrue until one year after entry of the decree. Id. at 902
{Rehnquist, J ., joined by Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). Rehnquist went on to
draw a parallel with consent decrees entered between private corporations and the Government to
resolve antitrust violations:
Surely, the existence of that decree does not preclude a future suit by another corporation alleging that the defendant company's conduct, even if authorized by the decree, constitutes an
antitrust violation. The nonparty has an independent right to bring his own private antitrust
action for treble damages or injunctive relief.
ld. at 902.
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ments.93 With the advent of the mandatory statutory bar in section 108,
courts should more readily, and perhaps presumptively, allow intervention in cases seeking institutional affirmative action. This section analyzes how the Rule 24 intervention criteria should apply when section
I 08 bars collateral attacks on consent decrees. 94
Rule 24 provides four criteria for analyzing a petition to intervene as
of right. 95 The applicant must show that: (I) the applicant has a qualifying interest; (2) disposition of the action may impair or impede the applicant's ability to protect that interest; (3) existing parties do not represent
the interest adequately; and (4) the application is timely. 96 The first three
of these criteria clearly point to the intervention of majority employees
who will be barred from filing an independent suit to challenge an affirmative action consent decree. The fourth criterion is more troublesome,
but, as discussed below, usually should favor intervention as well.
a.

Qualifying Interest Requirement

Courts construe the interest requirement of Rule 24(a) expansively
in order to achieve judicial economy and afford due process.97 Thus, the
District of Columbia Circuit has characterized "'the "interest" test [as]
primarily a practical guide to disposing of lawsuits by involving as many
apparently concerned persons as is compatible with efficiency and due
93. See infra note 110.
94. At first blush, sec. 108 may appear itself to answer the question of how Rule 24 should
apply in these cases. Section 108 provides that nothing in sec. 108 should "be construed to alter the
standards for intervention under Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." See supra note 8
(text of statute). The Act might, therefore, be deemed to "freeze" the intervention scenario as that
scenario stood before passage of the Act. One must distinguish, however, between preserving the
standards for intervention and preserving the end result of application of those standards. The Act
requires the former and not the latter. By barring collateral attacks, sec. 108 alters the factual
situation upon which Rule 24 operates, and thus will certainly affect the outcome resulting from
application of the preserved Rule 24 standards. Section 108 does not, however, resolve the vital
inquiry of what impact the collateral attack bar should have on the outcome of Rule 24 analysis.
95. This article considers the problem of intervention as of right, though a court has considerable discretion to permit intervention if it chooses. See FED. R. CJV. P. 24(b); supra note 85. Unlike
permissive intervention under Rule 24(b), intervention of right does not require the court to consider
the extent to which those already parties may be prejudiced by the intervention or the extent to
which intervention would delay the proceedings. FED. R. CJV. P. 24(b). In the employment discrimination consent decree context, this is significant because intervention by a majority employee
whose only interest was in forestalling settlement would severely prejudice the interests of those
already parties in settling the suit.
96. FED. R. CJV. P. 24(a).
97. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175, 179 (D.C. Cir. 1969); see also Cascade Natural Gas Corp.
v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129 (1967). But see Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517,
531 ( 1971 ). The effect of the employer's alleged discrimination need not rise to the level of depriving
the petitioner of a constitutionally cognizable property right. United States v. City of Chicago, 870
F.2d 1256, 1260 (7th Cir. 1989) (citing Cascade Natural Gas Corp. , 386 U.S. at 135-36); Bethune
Plaza, Inc. v. Lumpkin, 863 F.2d 525, 530 (7th Cir. 1988); Harris v. Pemsley, 820 F .2d 592, 600-01
(3d Cir. 1987); Howard v. McLucas, 782 F.2d 956, 958-59 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct.
560 (1989); Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist. No. l, 738 F.2d 82 (8th Cir.
1984) (per curiam); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Nuclear Regulatory
Comm'n, 578 F.2d 1341 (lOth Cir. 1978); EEOC v. AT&T, 506 F.2d 735, 741-42 (3d Cir. 1974).
See generally Carl Tobias, Standing to Intervene, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 415.
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process.' " 98 There are, however, some limits on what qualifies as an "interest" for purposes of Rule 24(a). The Supreme Court in Donaldson v.
United States specified that, to qualify, an interest must be "significantly
protectable." 99 By "significantly protectable," the Donaldson Court apparently meant two things: (1) that the interest should be one that courts
properly would recognize as worthy of the court's protection; and (2)
that the appropriate occasion for that protection is the time of the law
suit in which intervention is sought, rather than in some future case. 100
One problem with the Donaldson discussion is that it confuses impairment of the intervenor's interest (the first Rule 24 criterion) with impairment of the intervenor's ability to protect that interest (the second Rule
24 criterion). In fact, the impairment concept forms part of the "interest" analysis of the first prong, as well as constituting the second prong.
What is being impaired under each prong, however, is different. Under
the first criterion-"interest"-the impairment . in question is the infringement of the majority employees' substantive right not to be victims
of unlawful discrimination. 101 The impairment at issue under the second
Rule 24 criterion is not infringement of the intervenors' substantive legal
rights. Rather, assuming that their substantive interests are indeed
threatened, prong two asks whether the intervenors will be able to sue or
otherwise take action to protect against the threatened infringement.
The two aspects of the first Rule 24 criterion under the Donaldson "interest" inquiry, then, should be (1) whether the interest is a legal interestone the infringement of which is likely to give rise to a cause of action;
and (2) whether it appears likely that the original suit will indeed infringe
that interest.
The outcome of a court's applying Donaldson to ascertain whether
majority employees have an adequate interest in the case is not clear.
Applying the first part of the Donaldson rule to the would-be majority
employee intervenors, it should be beyond argument that the interest of
employees who expect to be treated illegally pursuant to a consent decree
qualifies for court protection. 102 In the consent decree context, the second aspect of the interest requirement asks whether the would-be inter98. Foster v. Gueory, 655 F.2d 1319, 1324 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (quoting Nuesse v. Camp, 385
F.2d 694, 700 (D.C. Cir. 1967)); see also Cascade Natural Gas Corp., 386 U.S. at 129.
99. Donaldson, 400 U.S. at 531.
100. See id.
101. This requirement that the interest be threatened actually has two aspects itself: is the de·
cree likely to infringe the interest, and is the interest a real one in that the benefit of which the decree
will deprive the plaintiff is a benefit that plaintiff would be likely to enjoy absent the decree. See
United States v. City of Chicago, 870 F.2d 1256, 1260 (7th Cir. 1989). See generally Tobias, supra
note 97.
102. Cf. Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 710-71 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (consent decree
cannot deprive majority of their right not to be victims of discrimination). Where this is the same
interest that gave rise to the suit initially, albeit based on different acts of discrimination from the
original claim, permitting the majority employees to intervene is especially in keeping with the rule's
goal of efficiency. Cj Foster, 655 F.2d at 1324-25. Of course, varying forms of affirmative action
intrude on the interests of the majority to varying degrees. See Schwarzschild, supra note l, at 90910.
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venor will be likely to or actually will suffer unlawful discrimination as a
result of the decree. Some courts have gone so far as to require that the
would-be intervenor actually become a victim of discrimination pursuant
to the decree in order to establish an adequate interest for purposes of
Rule 24. 103 In Howard v. McLucas, 104 for example, the Eleventh Circuit
permitted intervention only conditionally, pending the intervenors'
showing that they indeed were denied promotions unlawfully as a result
of the decree; a potentially injured interest was deemed insufficient to
support intervention to challenge the decree. tos Other circuits similarly
have specified that the would-be intervenor must, when he seeks intervention, have such an interest as to give him standing to bring an action
of his own. 106 The question, then, is how certain injury to the interest
must be in order to qualify the majority employees as having an interest
at all. An interest in not being a victim of unlawful reverse discrimination carries little weight under Rule 24 if the pertinent consent decree is
unlikely to infringe that interest. 107
Courts entering consent decrees are unlikely to enter decrees deliberately in derogation of the legal rights of nonparty majority employees. 108 Thus, any district court that enters a decree does so believing that
a subsequent suit to challenge the decree's legality would fail because no
infringement of the absentee's interest will result from the decree. Such
courts may be inclined, therefore, not to recognize the majority employees' interest as one adequately threatened to meet the interest requirement of Rule 24. Precisely because courts are likely to view a decision in
103. Some courts have held that "claims that a consent decree resulted in reverse discrimination
could not accrue until those seeking redress were denied promotions." Howard v. McLucas, 871
F.2d 1000, 1005 (lith Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 560 (1989). As discussed below, to delay availability of intervention until the promotions are actually denied could nullify Rule 24's opportunities,
especially combined with a strict reading of. Rule 24's timeliness requirement.
104. 871 F.2d 1000 (lith Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 560 (1989).. The court cited In re Birmingham Reverse Discrimination Employment Litigation, 833 F.2d 1492, 1498-99 (lith Cir. 1987),
aff'd sub nom . Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989), for the proposition that an action does not
accrue until the white employee has actually been denied a promotion. Howard, 811 F.2d at 1005.
The In re Birmingham court had announced that proposition to demonstrate that the white employees in that Case could not be bound by a consent decree in an earlier case to which the whites had not
been party, particularly in light ofthe fact that the whites' action had not even accrued at the time of
the earlier decree. In re Birmingham, 833 F.2d at 1499.
lOS. Howard, 811 F.2d at 1003.
106. Southern Christian Leadership v. Kelley, 747 F.2d 717, 780-81 (D.C. Cir. 1984); United
States v. AT&T, 642 F .2d 1285, 1291 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Francis v. Chamber of Commerce, 481 F .2d
192, 195 n.7 (4th Cir. 1973); Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 463 F.2d 1261, 1262 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
107. In the analogous case of Culbreath v. Dukakis, 630 F.2d 15 (1st Cir. 1989), the First
Circuit placed heavy weight on the fact that the would-be intervenors would not be prejudiced by
their exclusion from the suit, even given the judicial collateral attack bar, because the court believed
the would-be intervenors were unlikely to win a subsequent suit, even if collateral attack were available. /d. at 22-23. The Culbreath discussion was in connection with the prejudice prong of Rule
24's timeliness requirement, but reflects the same concern that the interest under Rule 24 must truly
be threatened.
108. It is permissible for consent decrees to deprive majority employees of employment advantages. The majority has a cause of action only if the decree violates the governing doctrine. See
infra note 209 and accompanying text.
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the making as correct, courts should hesitate to rely on the unlikelihood
that the majority employee's interest will be infringed by the decree as a
ground for finding that the majority employee has not met the interest
requirement. In this context, courts should instead presume that the decision will be wrong and find that the interest requirement is met. 109
b.

The Impair or Impede Requirement

Under the second Rule 24(a) criterion, the applicant for intervention
must show that resolution of questions of fact or law in the case may
affect the applicant's position either legally or practically. Because of the
collateral attack bar, the applicant may meet this impairment requirement, even though the resolution does not threaten to bind the applicant
in a formal res judicata sense. 110 The case of the majority employees who
will be barred from bringing an independent law suit thus should be
easy-something equivalent to res judicata will bar these people. Clearly,
if the interest itself qualifies, the majority employees' ability to protect
that interest is impaired by a collateral attack bar.
c.

Inadequate Representation Requirement

The third Rule 24(a) criterion requires the applicant for intervention
to show that the applicant's interests are not represented adequately by
those who already are party to the suit. The applicant need show only
that "representation of his interest may be inadequate; and the burden of
making that showing should be treated as minimal." 111 To demonstrate
109. Such early intervention, moreover, need not force those already parties to litigate their
entire case when all they want is to settle. The scope of the intervenor's interest should define the
scope of his challenge. Thus, the successful intervenor can litigate the legality of the consent decree,
but cannot force litigation of whether the plaintiff in the case should prevail in the cause of action.
As will be explained, the issues in the plaintiff's case and the issues in the intervenor's case are two
very different things. See infra note 219 and accompanying text.
110. See United States v. City of Chicago, 870 F.2d 1256, 1262 (7th Cir. 1989) (citing Marino v.
Ortiz, 806 F.2d 1144, 1146 (2d Cir. 1986), aff'd by an equally divided court, 484 U.S. 301, 304
(1988); Striffv. Mason, 849 F.2d 240, 245 (6th Cir. 1988)); Foster v. Gueory, 655 F.2d 1319, 1325
(D.C. Cir. 1981) (citing Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694, 700 (D.C. Cir. 1967)); Bolden v. Pennsylvania State Police, 578 F.2d 912, 922 (3d Cir. 1978) (Garth, J ., concurring in part and dissenting
in part); Kramer, supra note 1, at 340; cf. United States v. Jefferson County, 720 F.2d 1511 (lith
Cir. 1983) (denial of intervention because reverse discrimination suit available); FED. R. Civ. P. 24
advisory committe notes to 1966 amends. Some courts have recognized an adequate impediment
from the mere stare decisis effect of a court's resolution of a novel question of law. See United States
v. Oregon, 839 F.2d 635, 638 (9th Cir. 1988); National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United
States Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 578 F.2d 1341, 1345 (lOth Cir. 1978); Atlantis Dev. Corp. v.
United States, 379 F.2d 818, 826 (5th Cir. 1967); cf Ionian Shipping Co. v. British Laws Ins. Co.,
426 F.2d 186, 190 (2d Cir. 1970).
111. Trbovich v. United Mine Workers, 404 U.S. 528, 538 n.IO (1972); Foster, 655 F .2d at 1325
(citing Trbovich, 404 U.S. 528; Natural Resources Defense Council v. Costle, 561 F.2d 904, 911
(D.C. Cir. 1977)). Courts disagree on who should bear the burden of showing adequacy or inadequacy of representation. See John E. Kennedy, Let's All Join In: Intervention Under Federal Rule
24, 51 KY. L.J. 329, 353-54 (1969); Kramer, supra note 1, at 351 (citing 7 WRIGHT ET AL, supra
note 64, § 1909, at 314-15 & nn.5-6 (citing cases)); 3B MooRE & KENNEDY, supra note 89, ~
24.07[4], at 24-72 to -73 & nn.9-ll. Some courts have suggested that, under the 1966 amendments
to Rule 24, the burden is on the party opposing intervention to show that representation is adequate
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inadequacy of representation, the applicant need show merely that the
applicant's interests differ from those of the parties. 112 Even minor differences between the applicant's interest and the putative representatives'
interest are adequate to support intervention under Rule 24. Thus, if the
petitioner can show that the employer does not represent its "distinct
viewpoint," the petitioner should prevail on this criterion. 113
At the outset of an employment discrimination institutional reform
case, the majority employees' interests are likely to be identical to the
defendant/employer's interests: both want to show that the challenged
act is lawful and that affirmative action is therefore inappropriate. 114 If
negotiations toward settlement between the employer and the minority
employees are promising, however, the employer's interest frequently
shifts from an interest in defeating the minority employees' claim to a
superseding interest in settling the immediate case and minimizing financial liability. 115 When an employer agrees to undertake affirmative action in exchange for dismissal of the suit, the employer, in essence, is
willing to assume-for the sake of argument-that it has discriminated. 116 The majority employee, by contrast, always remains interested
in demonstrating that no discrimination has occurred in order to show
that affirmative action is unwarranted. Once it is shown that the employer is interested in settling, the discrepancy between the majority interest and the employer's interest generally should pass muster on this
requirement of Rule 24.1 17
in cases where the petitioner has succeeded in demonstrating interest and impairment. See Smuck v.
Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694 (D.C. Cir. 1967); cf. Bolden
v. Pennsylvania State Police, 578 F.2d 912 (3d Cir. 1978); 7A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 64,
§ 1909, at 521. Some courts require a greater showing of inadequate representation when the government is a party because the government is presumed to represent the public interest. See United
States v. Hooker Chern. & Plastics, 749 F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 1984); Commonwealth v. Rizzo, 530 F .2d
SOl, 505 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 921 (1976); Illinois v. Bristol-Myers Co., 470 F.2d 1276
(D.C. Cir. 1972). This presumption may be rebutted by showing that the petitioner presently has an
interest adverse to the government's. Bolden, 578 F.2d at 923 (Garth, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). If the court denies a majority employee intervention because the employee's
interests are "adequately represented" by parties, the representation provided by present parties
must be sufficient to bind the absentee under the Due Process Clause. See Kramer, supra note 1, at
350 (citing 3B MOORE & KENNEDY, supra note 89, ~ 24.07[4], at 24-68); 7 WRIGHT ET AL., supra
note 64, § 1909, at 313.
112. Foster, 655 F.2d at 1325.
113. Johnson v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 500 F.2d 349, 354 (9th Cir. 1974).
114. The statement in text assumes that the parties go into the case expecting to have to litigate.
In fact, parties to the suit sometimes negotiate the settlement before the suit begins and file a complaint together with a proposed consent decree that the court may approve immediately. Schwarzschild, supra note 1, at 913.
11 S. The time for measuring adequacy of representation in decree negotiations is the time when
the employee files the petition for intervention. Bolden, 578 F.2d at 924 (Garth, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
116. /d. at 923 (Garth, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See Smuck v. Hobson, 408
F.2d 175, 181-82 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
117. See Bolden, 578 F.2d at 923 (Garth, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Kramer,
supra note 1, at 352. Absentees who have been adequately represented at the consent decree negotiation stage may succeed in showing that their "representative" presently does not represent their
interests in modifying a consent decree. Cf United Airlines v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385, 395 (1977).
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There may be concern that delaying the inadequacy determination
until the employer undertakes settlement negotiations will render the intervention too late to be timely under the fourth Rule 24 criterion. In
fact, as discussed below, the timeliness requirement imposes upon the
petitioner an obligation to seek intervention only when it becomes evident that available representation is inadequate. Thus, if it is the commencement of settlement negotiations that terminates adequacy of
representation, the majority employees' waiting for settlement negotiations to commence should not render the petition to intervene
untimely. 118
Some argue that the employer's interests are actually at odds with
the majority employees' interests from the beginning because the employer, from the beginning, has "different cost-benefit settlement interests, and incentives, from those of the [majority employees]." 119 Courts
thus might consider differences between the absentee's interest and the
employer's potential interest in settling. 120 Acting on the assumption
that the employer ultimately will desire to settle would be reasonable
inasmuch as most Title VII cases are resolved through settlement. 121
Nevertheless, recognizing inadequacy of representation based solely on
potential for the employer's settlement interests would result in a finding
that majority employees are inadequately represented in every minority
suit seeking affirmative action. Prior to initiation of settlement talks,
there would be no way to distinguish cases in which the interests of the
majority would ultimately be adequately represented at trial. Thus, if
mere potential for settlement rendered the employer's representation inadequate, majority employees either would unnecessarily intervene or, if
they waited to see whether settlement became likely' might be deemed to
have petitioned for intervention too late. As a rule, then, courts should
deem representation inadequate only upon commencement of settlement
negotiations. 122
118. See United States v. City of Chicago, 870 F.2d 1256, 1263 (7th Cir. 1989).
119. United States v. Jefferson County, 720 F.2d 1511, 1516 (11th Cir. 1983). It has been suggested that any time two parties have the power to settle their law suit at the expense of a third party,
the representation is per se inadequate. See Kramer, supra note 1, at 352.
120. See Jefferson County, 120 F.2d at 1516.
121. Schwarzschild, supra note l, at 893-94; see also EEOC v. Sage Realty Corp., 521 F. Supp.
263 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
122. The goals of Title VII and Rule 24 can best be effectuated if courts aim to achieve majority
employee intervention immediately preceding or shortly after entry of the decree. If a majority
employee cannot reasonably understand the decree's ramifications until after its implementation,
then postimplementation intervention must be permitted as timely. See City of Chicago, 810 F.2d at
1263. Courts should construe the timeliness requirement accordingly. The danger with employees
making earlier predictions about whether their interests are at stake is that the employees may come
to an incorrect conclusion and intervene unnecessarily. One court has suggested, moreover, that
intervention shortly after initiation of the suit to defend an unlawful employment practice that benefits the majority is improper. /d. If majority employees intervene early as a protective measure, they
later may find that the defendant prevails at trial and they are unharmed, or that the ultimate consent decree would have had no impact on their interests even if they had not intervened, and that
they have wasted time, money, and judicial resources. Cf McDonald v. Lavino Co., 430 F.2d 1065
(5th Cir. 1970). Similarly, if the court denies such an early petition for intervention, "purposeless
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The Timeliness Requirement

Timeliness is perhaps the most difficult of the Rule 24 requirements
to apply in these cases; it is also the requirement on which majority employees' applications for intervention most often flounder. 123 As articulated by one court, "the purpose of the requirement is to prevent a tardy
intervenor from derailing a lawsuit within sight of the terminal. " 124
Whether a petition to intervene is timely is a question committed to judicial discretion. 125 Courts have developed crit~ria to guide the exercise of
that discretion, and the process of deciding the petition involves a balancing of these criteria: 126 "Whether a motion to intervene is timely made is
'~o be determined from all the circumstances, including the purpose for
which intervention is sought . . . and the improbability of prejudice to
those already in the case.' " 127
A petition is timely if it is made soon enough after the petitioner
learns of his interest, and "soon enough" is measured by comparing any
prejudice to the parties that the delay causes against prejudice inuring to
the petitioner if he is excluded from the suit, in light of any special circumstances. In Stallworth v. Monsanto, 128 the Fifth Circuit reduced the
timeliness analysis to four factors:
(1) the length of delay between when petitioner learned or should
have learned of his interest in the suit and when he petitioned to
intervene;
appeals" may result. Stallworth v. Monsanto Co., 558 F.2d 257, 265 (5th Cir. 1977). Conversely,
majority employees may be unable to appreciate the significance of the suit at an early date, and the
court should not deny intervention once the terms of the decree become evident. Moreover, an early
intervention petition based on projections about what relief will result from a suit may fail simply
because the tenuous information available to majority employees at this early date does not permit
the employees to show that they risk impairment of a ..significantly protectable interest." Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 531 (1971). Negotiations may not have reached an advanced
enough stage to permit protectable interests to be articulated. It is thus important that the timeliness
clock not to begin ticking until the threat to the intervenors' interest is somewhat concrete.
123. See Schwarzschild, supra note l, at 920. A court may encourage early intervention by
having the plaintiffs specify whether they will seek classwide injunctive relief, and then may formulate notice to nonparty majority employees that includes notice of the probable impact on various
nonparties. See Strickler, supra note 38, at 159().91. Because the petitioner stands to lose more
when intervention would be of right, rather than permissive, courts should be reluctant to deny
intervention as of right on timeliness grounds. McDonald, 430 F.2d at 1073.
124. United States v. South Bend Community Sch. Corp., 710 F.2d 394, 396 (7th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 466 U.S. 926 (1984). Exactly what constitutes the ..terminal" when a court enters a
consent decree is open to question. Once the decree is entered, the court may retain jurisdiction
indefinitely over the decree to hear disputes about the decree. United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S.
106, 114 (1932).
125. NAACP v. New York, 413 U.S. 345, 365-66 (1973); United States v. Jefferson County, 720
F.2d 1511, 1516 (11th Cir. 1983); Howse v. SIV ..Canada Goose I," 641 F .2d 317, 320 (5th Cir.
. 1981); Stallworth, 558 F.2d at 263; McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1120 (8th Cir.
1977).
126. See McDonald, 430 F .2d at 1071-74.
127. Foster v. Gueory, 655 F.2d 1319, 1324 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (quoting Natural Resources Defense Council v. Costle, 561 F.2d 904, 907 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (citing Hodgson v. United Mine Workers, 473 F.2d 118, 129 (D.C. Cir. 1972))); see also NAACP v. New York, 413 U.S. at 365-66.
128. 558 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1977). Courts from a variety of circuits have subsequently relied
upon the Stallworth analysis. See Kramer, supra note 1, at 341 & n.87.
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(2) the extent of prejudice resulting to the existing parties caused by
petitioner's delay;
(3) the prejudice that would accrue to the petitioner if his petition
were denied; and
(4) the existence of any unusual circumstances militating either for
or against a conclusion that the application is timely. 129
The first of the Stallworth factors focuses on "[t]he length of time
during which the would-be intervenor actually knew or reasonably
should have known of [his] interest in the case before [he] petitioned for
leave to intervene." 130 The Stallworth court cautioned that absolute
measures of timeliness, such as the amount of time that may have elapsed
since initiation of the action, should not be dispositive. 131 Rather than
calculating the time expired since the filing of the complaint, the task for
the judge deciding whether to permit majority employee intervention is
to determine when the majority employees should have realized that the
suit would jeopardize their ability to protect their interests. As stated
above, courts generally agree that no duty to intervene arises until the
intervenor knows or should know that his interests may be affected by
the suit. 132 The answer to the question of when the intervenor "should
know" that his interests are threatened depends largely on who the
129. Stallworth, 558 F.2d at 264-66; see United States v. City of Chicago, 798 F.2d 969,975 (7th
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1041 (1988).
130. Stallworth, 558 F.2d at 264. If the petitioner has known of his interest all along, but has
understood his interests to have been adequately represented, then the time is measured from the
time at which the petitioner learns the representation is inadequate. United Air Lines Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385 (1977). If the petitioner never had actual knowledge of the suit, courts may
shift the burden to prove that intervention should be denied to the party opposing intervention. See
McClain v. Wagner Elec. Corp., 550 F.2d 1115, 1120 (8th Cir. 1977).
131. Although the Supreme Court's decision in NAACP v. New York, 413 U.S. 345 (1973),
relies upon knowledge of the suit's pendency to calculate untimeliness, the Stallworth court rejected
arguments that such reliance means that learning of the lawsuit should start the clock for purposes
of determining whether the applicant acted promptly. Stallworth, 558 F.2d at 264. The Stallworth
court rejected such a construction for three reasons: (1) in the NAACP case, circumstances were
such that notice of the suit was the equivalent of notice that the applicant's interests were involved,
so the court had no occasion to address the question of whether knowledge of the suit alone would
have been enough; (2) in the more recent Supreme Court case of United Air Lines v. McDonald, 432
U.S. 385 (1977), the Court had gauged timeliness from the date when the applicant learned its
interests were no longer adequately represented; and (3) a rule making knowledge of the suit's pendency the trigger would result in applications from people without a need to intervene and a bar of
applicants with a need to intervene whose need was unrecognized when interventions would have
been timely. Stallworth, 558 F.2d at 264-65. Judge Garth took a similar stance in his dissenting
opinion in Bolden v. Pennsylvania State Police, 578 F.2d 912, 926 (3d Cir. 1978) (measuring timeliness of petition from date on which events occurred that gave rise to applicants' claims for relief).
Subsequent cases have followed suit. In United States v. South Bend Community School Corp., 710
F .2d 394, 396 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 926 (1984), for example, the Seventh Circuit
specified that petitioner for intervention "must move promptly to intervene" as soon as he "knows or
has reason to know that [his] interests might be adversely affected by the outcome of the litigation."
/d. at 396; see also Kramer, supra note 1, at 341 & n.87. But see United States v. AT&T, 642 F.2d
1285, 1295 (D.C. Cir. 1980). This rule is consistent with the rule that statutory periods for cutting
off the right to bring a claim may not be permitted to run before the plaintiff should know of this
claim. See Kramer, supra note 1, at 341 n.86 (citing Wilson v. Iseminger, 185 U.S. 55, 62 (1902)).
132. To require intervention at any stage when the intervenor neither knows nor reasonably
should know might violate due process. Cf Kramer, supra note 1, at 344 & n.98. How much time
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would-be intervenor is. 133
The Stallworth court refused to require the particular intervenors in
that case to "fathomO the potential impact of [an] admittedly complex
case on their seniority rights'' prior to the date on which the applicants
actually knew for a fact that their contractual rights were in jeopardy,
that is, when the consent decree actually was entered. 134 In Culbreath v.
Dukakis, 135 by contrast, the court required that would-be intervenors act
shortly after they gained knowledge of the suit itself. 136 In the view of
the Culbreath court, the complaint and the front-page newspaper reports
indicating that the plaintiff was seeking an affirmative action remedy
were adequate to apprise the applicants that affirmative action measures
would result in nonminorities' being passed over in favor of minorities. 137
The major difference between Stallworth and Culbreath was in how
the courts viewed the petitioners for intervention. The Culbreath court
deemed the notice of the suit to be adequate notice of potential harm
because the intervenors in Culbreath were sophisticated unions capable
of translating newspaper accounts, and the relief sought in the complaint,
into threats to their interests. 138 Therefore, the court was willing to impute knowledge of the union's interest in the suits from knowledge of the
suits themselves. In Stallworth, by contrast, because the would-be intervenors were the individual employees themselves, and thus presumably
less sophisticated than the unions in Culbreath, the court looked to the
date when the intervenors subjectively understood the suit's threat to
their interest. Other courts agree that simple knowledge of the suit does
not necessarily trigger the time, absent some reason such as that in Culbreath, to impute knowledge that the intervenor's interests may be
affected. 139
the court permits to elapse between the intervenor's learning he should intervene and the petition for
intervention depends on the circumstances of each case. /d. at 344-45.
133. The court has several possible choices on when the would-be intervenor "should know" his
interests are threatened:
(1) when the law suit commences or the intervenor has notice of the suit;
(2) when the decree is entered or the intervenor has notice of the decree; or
(3) when action is taken pursuant to the decree which harms the intervenor.
Once the intervenor should know of the threat to his interest, courts allow a reasonable time for the
intervenor to investigate the facts and law and to prepare a petition for intervention. See United
States v. City of Chicago, 870 F.2d 1256, 1263 (7th Cir. 1989) (six weeks not excessive delay).
134. Stallworth, 558 F.2d at 267; see Corley v. Jackson Police Dep't, 755 F.2d 1207, 1210 (5th
Cir. 1985).
135. 630 F.2d 15 (1st Cir. 1980).
136. /d. at 21.
137. The Culbreath court, moreover, found that knowledge that the petitioner had a legal interest in the suit would suffice to establish the date of knowledge, even though subsequently (too late)
the petitioner developed a much greater interest. /d. at 21.
138. /d.
139. Jones v. Caddo Parish Sch. Bd., 735 F.2d 923, 934 & n.l4 (5th Cir. 1984); Stallworth, 558
F.2d at 267; id. at 946 (Rubin, J., dissenting). But see Schultz v. Connery, 863 F.2d 551, 553-55 (7th
Cir. 1988); EEOC v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 675 F.2d 164, 166 (8th Cir. 1982). In United Airlines v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385 (1977), the Supreme Court held that the time for intervening
should be deemed to commence only when the petitioner realizes that a party to the suit is no longer
representing the petitioner's interests. /d. at 395. This decision confirms a pragmatic, reasonable
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Questions of timeliness are complicated when the absentee has not
even applied yet for a position with the defendant or otherwise could not
possibly know even with notice of the decree that his interests will be
affected. 140 Courts in these circumstances should remain faithful to the
rule that an intervenor cannot be expected to petition for intervention
prior to actual or imputed knowledge of the threat. For people who are
not employees or applicants at the time the decree is entered, and whose
interests were not represented, petitions to intervene should be deemed
timely if filed when the petitioners learn of the decree's effects on them,
although that may be long after entry of the decree. 141
Ascertaining the time at which the petitioner should be deemed to
know of the threat to his interests is only the beginning of the analysis
under Stallworth's first criterion, because this criterion requires the court
to look at the length of delay between when the petitioner knows of the
threat to his interest and when the petitioner seeks intervention. Once
the court determines when the petitioner had knowledge, however, it is
only by looking at the second Stallworth criterion that the court can assess the significance of any delay between knowledge and filing of the
petition. Whether the delay is two weeks or two years, a delay is too long
only if it causes prejudice to those who already are parties to the
decree. 142
Courts differ about what sort of prejudice qualifies under this criterion. According to Stallworth, the court should measure only that prejudice resulting from the applicant's delay, not prejudice that would result
from the very fact of intervention regardless of timing. 143 The Culbreath
court, by contrast, modified Stallworth and required that prejudice to the
parties caused by the intervention itself, rather than by the delay, should
person approach to the question of when the responsibility to intervene begins. See also Bolden v.
Pennsylvania State Police, 578 F.2d 912, 919 (3d Cir. 1978) (timeliness of application for intervention determined by reference to time elapsed since conflict arose between petitioner's and representative's interests); Alaniz v. California Processors, Inc., 73 F.R.D. 289, 294-95 (N.D. Cal. 1976). In
NAACP v. New York, 413 U.S. 345 (1973), the Supreme Court found untimeliness because it
should have been evident to the would-be intervenors that the parties were about to settle the case to
the intervenors' detriment. ld. at 367; see also Caddo, 735 F.2d 923.
If timeliness is gauged from the time the petitioner knows of the suit, rather than when he
knows his interests may be impaired, the effect of this requirement would be that the petitioner for
intervention would have to file his petition before he could qualify under the other Rule 24 criteria,
and thus lose the opportunity to intervene at all. As stated earlier, the interests of the majority
employees are likely to become visibly adverse to the interests of their employer only when the
employer is eyeing settlement possibilities. See supra note 122 and accompanying text. Thus the
petitioner may be incapable of showing that his interests are inadequately represented at the time
when he first learns of the suit. Such early petitions for intervention may meet with the further
challenge that the petitioner lacks standing to raise a claim so speculative.
140. Under sec. 108, such unknown future applicants are not barred unless their interests are
adequately represented. An expansive construction of Rule 24 will help to assure that their interests
are, in fact, protected, and that postdecree intervention by such absentees will not become necessary.
141. If courts insist on deeming untimely petitions to intervene filed after entry of the decree,
such petitioners cannot be said to have had a reasonable opportunity to be heard under sec. 108.
142. Stallworth, 558 F.2d at 265; Nevilles v. EEOC, 511 F.2d 303 (8th Cir. 1975).
143. Stallworth, 558 F.2d at 265.
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be measured under this factor. 144 The Culbreath court acknowledged

that the delay in intervention in that case had caused no prejudice. 14s
The court instead looked at whether the intervention itself caused the
parties any prejudice. The Culbreath court identified as "prejudice" the
fact that the unions were "likely to oppose the goal provisions of the
consent decree," opposition which might have the effect of delaying or
denying the relief to which the parties had agreed. 146 The Culbreath
"any prejudice" doctrine thus would have significant implications for
those who seek intervention in employment discrimination consent decree cases: under the Culbreath view, the desire of any majority employee to challenge the consent decree would qualify as "prejudice" to
the parties. The Culbreath prejudice analysis would preclude intervention in every consent decree case. If it properly may be assumed that
intervention should occur in at least some consent decree cases, then Culbreath provides no guidance on when. "Prejudice," then, should be measured according to the Stallworth rule that only prejudice resulting from
the delay is relevant.
Although absolute measures of timeliness should not be dispositive
of the timeliness issue, courts seem to treat entry of the judgment in the
case as a demarcation for purposes of prejudice: cases suggest that those
petitions for intervention filed before judgment are more likely to be
granted than those filed after judgment. 147 The rationale for the demarcation is that if intervention is sought before the decree, then prej1,1dice to
existing parties is less likely to result from the delay because the existing
parties will not have invested time and energy in negotiating and implementing the decree. 148 Some courts view "[i]ntervention after entry of a
144. Culbreath v. Dukakis, 630 F.2d 15, 21-22 (lst Cir. 1980).
145. The Culbreath opinion states:
We see little prejudice to the parties caused by the failure of the unions to intervene more
promptly. In fact, we note that, had any such prejudice been apparent, it could have been
remedied by joinder of the unions. We do, however, perceive real prejudice to the parties if the
unions are allowed to intervene.
/d. at 22 (citation omitted).
The Culbreath court thus apparently took the Stallworth party-prejudice from delay factor to
mean that the court should look at whether the intervenors' absence from the case in the past had
been prejudicial to the parties, rather than whether the staleness of the intervenors' Claim would
prejudice the parties.
146. Admittedly there is also language in Culbreath about the "delayed intervention of the unions [having caused] several ofthe target dates in the consent decree [to be] nullified," but the court
does not distinguish the issue of what difference it made prejudice-wise that the intervenors petitioned so late in the game and what prejudice was caused by the mere fact of intervention, regardless
of its timing. /d. at 22.
·
147. See 7C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 64, § 1916, at 444; cf. McClain v. Wagner Elec. Co.,
SSO F.2d 1115 (8th Cir. 1976); McDonald & E.J. Lavino, Co., 430 F .2d 1065 (5th Cir. 1970). The
Supreme Court has upheld postjudgment intervention in appropriate cases. United Airlines Inc. v.
McDonald, 432 U.S. 385 (1977); see also Stallworth, 558 F.2d at 267.
148. Note, however, that the court can enter the decree over the intervenor's objections, and the
intervenor can then keep the suit alive to contest the legality of the decree. Firefighters v. City of
Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 529 (1986). The other parties at least will be forewarned of this possibility
though. According to the court in Jones v. Caddo Parish School Board, the particular prejudice
following entry of a consent decree may be that "positions have hardened, concessions here have
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consent decree [as] reserved for exceptional cases." 149 Thus, if the parties have completed extensive discovery, and the petitioner's untimely entry into the suit would force revisitation of many of the discovery issues,
prejudice would weigh against granting the petition. 150 While such a demarcation may hold sway in some circumstances, it is especially inappropriate in the consent decree context. Strict implementation of such a cutoff would increase the number of majority employees not represented in
the earlier suit, and thus increase the number of collateral challenges. To
the extent that a judgment day cut-off is based on a desire not to waste
the judicial and parties' resources expended in reaching the judgment,
that basis is less fitting in the present context because majority employees
not represented or permitted to intervene may bring entirely separate
·
suits.
The third Stallworth timeliness factor also concerns prejudice. Here
the inquiry pertains not to prejudice to the parties, but rather to the
amount of prejudice that the would-be intervenor may suffer if the court
denies his petition for leave to intervene. The threat to the would-be
intervenor of being permanently foreclosed from bringing a later challenge to the consent decree should qualify as such prejudice. 151 Barring
unusual circumstances militating against intervention, this prejudice to
the would-be intervenor who may be collaterally estopped seemingly
should outweigh all other considerations. Nevertheless, courts may
sometimes take a contrary position. In Culbreath, the court acknowledged that unavailability of the opportunity for collateral attack placed
the applicants in the difficult position of having no opportunity to challenge the decree. 152 The Culbreath court discounted this prejudice, however, because it believed that the would-be intervenors would have had
only a very weak chance of prevailing in a subsequent attack, had one
been traded for those there, persons, groups, and institutions have gone on the line publicly, and
months of effort and mobilization of community and citizen involvement have been expended."
Jones v. Caddo Parish Sch. Bd., 735 F.2d 923, 935 (5th Cir. 1984). In Caddo, the court noted that
permitting the intervenors into the case after entry of the consent decree would render "all the time,
effort and meetings" wasted. /d.
149. Alaniz v. Tillie Lewis Foods, 572 F.2d 657, 659 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 439
U .S. 837 (1978) (quoted in Caddo, 735 F.2d at 935).
150. Commonwealth v. Rizzo, 530 F .2d 501 (3d Cir.) cert. denied, 426 U.S. 921 (1975). In such
cases, leave to intervene may be made subject to the intervenor's accepting discovery that has taken
place. Boldon v. Pennsylvania State Police, 578 F.2d 912, 927 (3d Cir. 1978) (Garth, J. , concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
151. See Caddo, 735 F.2d at 936-37; Foster v. Gueory, 655 F.2d 1319, 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1981);
McDonald v. E.J. Lavino Co., 430 F.2d 1065 (5th Cir. 1970); cf. United States v. Jefferson County,
720 F.2d 1511, 1519 (lith Cir. 1983); United States v. City of Jackson, 519 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir.
1975). See Schwarzschild, supra note I, at 922.
152. Surprisingly, the court added that "[i]ntervention to modify the decree, the proper procedural recourse under the circumstances, [would] be barred by the doctrine of res judicata." Culbreath v. Dukakis, 630 F.2d 15, 22-23 (lst Cir. 1980) (citing O'Burn v. Shapp, 70 F.R.D. 549 (E.D.
Pa.), aff'd, 546 F.2d 418 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 968 (1977)); Construction Indus.
Combined Comm. v. Operating Eng'rs, Local 513, 67 F.R.D. 664, 666 (E.D. Mo. 1975) (intervention would be the proper recourse).
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been permitted. 153 This was because the court viewed the entry of a consent decree as a determination by the court that the plaintiff was likely to
succeed on the merits. The plaintiff's probability of success, of course,
demonstrated the defendant's and intervenor's probability of failure in a
subsequent challenge, if one had been available. 154
What the Culbreath court suggests, then, is that refusing to permit
majority employees to intervene does not prejudice these employees be.cause the court probably made a good decision to enter the decree, and
thus any challenge to that decision would have failed anyway. This suggestion seems to mean that any time a consent decree is or will be entered, the intervenors cannot satisfy the prejudice prong. If we may
properly assume that there are some consent decree cases in which intervention by majority employees is appropriate, then the Culbreath decision cannot help us distinguish between those who should intervene and
those who should not. 155
The fourth Stallworth factor questions whether any unusual circumstances militate either for or against a determination that the application
is timely. 156 Such factors may be that the would-be intervenor was unable to intervene earlier or, as in Stallworth, that the district court refused to permit the employer to give notice to its white employees of the
potential import of the suit. 1 57 There are two unusual circumstances in
consent decree cases, both pointing to timeliness. One is the peculiar
circumstances of the majority employees who seek admittance to the suit.
153. Culbreath, 630 F.2d at 23.
154. /d. The Culbreath court measured prejudice to the unions from denial of intervention "to
be as slight as the unions' probability of success on the merits of the issues they would raise upon
intervention." /d. The court derived its authority to gauge the union's probability of success on the
merits on the court's "extensive exposure to the Massachusetts civil service system," rather than on
evidence in the case. /d. This exposure led the court to conclude that the unions had little chance of
success on the merits of their complaints and that, therefore, the prejudice to the union would be
slight if the court did not permit them to intervene. In his concurring opinion in Culbreath, Senior
Circuit Judge Aldrich took issue with the majority's passing on the merits of the unions' case when
the unions had yet to receive an opportunity to present their case. /d. at 25.
It is interesting to note in this connection that most employers who settle via consent decree
specify in the decree that they admit no liability. Schwarzschild, supra note 1, at 895 (citing United
States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, Ill (1931); EEOC v. AT&T, 556 F.2d 167, 176 (3d Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 438 U.S. 915 (1978)).
155. Whereas Stallworth suggests that leniency should be given when courts are considering
prejudice to the would·be intervenor seeking intervention as of right, Culbreath affords no leniency.
Each circuit has company in these views. Cases following Stallworth include: Sanguine, Ltd. v.
United States Dep't of Interior, 736 F.2d 1416 (lOth Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1054 (1987);
Lelsz v. Kavanagh, 710 F .2d 1040 (5th Cir. 1983). Cases following Culbreath include: Garrity v.
Gallen, 697 F.2d 452 (lst Cir. 1983); United Nuclear Corp. v. Cannon, 696 F.2d 141 (1st Cir. 1982).
See Jones v. Caddo Parish Sch. Bd., 704 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1983); EEOC v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 675 F.2d 164 (8th Cir. 1982).
156. Stallworth, 558 F.2d at 266. The Stallworth court found it unnecessary to consider this
factor because the other three factors pointed to intervention. /d. at 267.
157. /d. at 266. The Culbreath court found unusual circumstances militating against intervention in the fact that the affirmative action at issue did not violate certain collective bargaining agreements. Culbreath, 630 F.2d at 24. Courts may also consider as a factor militating in favor of
intervention the fact that no party to the decree represented the would-be intervenor's interests.

78

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 1992

The other is the availability of limited purpose intervention and the protection such intervention affords those already party to the suit.
The peculiar circumstances of majority employees seeking intervention in the minority suit may count as "an unusual circumstance militating in favor of a determination that the application is timely." 158 The
collateral attack bar should weigh in favor of a timeliness finding because
a finding of untimeliness would have the extreme consequence of permanently barring intervention. This position finds support in the Supreme
Court's NAACP v. New York 159 opinion. In denying intervention in that
case, the Supreme Court relied upon the unusual circumstance that the
would-lie intervenors would not be foreclosed from direct and collateral
challenges of the redistricting plans that concerned the would-be intervenors.160 If availability of collateral challenge weighed against timeliness in NAACP, then presumably unavailability of such a challenge
should weigh in favor of a finding of timeliness. On the other hand, the
potential need to avoid multitudinous collateral challenges to consent decrees if intervention is denied may cause courts to find the circumstances
counsel in favor of intervention in the instant suit. Because section 108
forecloses suits only by those whose interests have been adequately represented, 161 the court may find that permitting intervention in the minority
suit is by far the most efficient way to proceed for those whose interests
are not represented.
The court also may consider the fact that the would-be intervenor
seeks "limited purpose" intervention as an unusual circumstance militating in favor of intervention. 162 "Limited purpose" intervention means
that the intervenor will not force the other parties to relitigate their entire
case or unnecessarily litigate portions of the case that have been settled.
As is discussed below, this is an appropriate option for the majority employee who intervenes in the minority employees' suit.
Not only do the standards of Rule 24, strictly applied, dictate that
courts generally should permit majority employee intervention in these
employment discrimination cases, but the policies underlying the rule
158. As suggested above, courts may deem the niere opportunity to seek intervention to be an
adequate "opportunity to be heard" for purposes of sec. 108.
159. 413 u.s. 345 (1973).
160. /d. at 368. The Court also found that a grant of intervention in that case would have
"seriously disrupt[ed] the State's electoral process." /d. at 369. Courts should not consider here the
disruption that invariably occurs as a result of intervention in a consent decree suit. Such disruption
has already been considered as a form of prejudice resulting from the applicant's delay in intervening. See supra notes 142-50 and accompanying text.
161. Section 108 defines the class of adequately represented people as persons "whose interests
were adequately represented by another person who had previously challenged the judgment or order on the same legal grounds and with a similar factual situation, unless there has been an intervening change in law or fact." Pub. L. No. 102-166, sec. 108, 105 Stat. 1071, 1076 (Nov. 21, 1991)
(amending Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(n)(1)(B)(ii), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000h (1988)).
162. Jones v. Caddo Parish Sch. Bd., 735 F.2d 923, 938 (5th Cir. 1984); cf. Kirkland v. New
York State Dep't of Correctional Servs., 711 F.2d 1117 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1005
(1984).

No. 1]

SILENCED MAJORITY

79

also support intervention. A major purpose of Rule 24 is "to protect
non-parties from having their interests adversely affected by litigation
conducted without their participation." 163 Permitting intervention will
assure due process and will avoid unfairness in the event the section 108
collateral bar is construed to apply to majority employees who have had
an opportunity to petition for intervention, but whose petitions have been
denied. Courts must construe the intervention rule carefully and consistently with the liberal joinder policies underlying it to ensure fairness to
.the parties and to majority employees seeking intervention. 164 In short,
courts should encourage joinder by intervention. By contrast, courts
should view joinder under Rule 19 less favorably m these
circumstances. 165
2.

Joinder of Necessary and Indispensable Parties
a. . What Rule 19 Is

Unlike intervention, which is a mechanism for absentees to interject
themselves into a suit, Rule 19 permits a party to the ·suit (usually the
defendant) to force joinder of someone the plaintiff initially elected not to
sue. Suppose that a group of majority employees receives notice of a
discrimination suit that seeks affirmative action, but chooses not to intervene. The defendant in the suit, concerned that any settlement of the suit
may ultimately meet with opposition from these absent employees, brings
the problem of their absence to the court's attention. To raise this issue,
the defendant must invoke Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, governing joinder of necessary and indispensable parties. 166
163. Caddo, 735 F.2d at 935. Although the timing of intervention may cause the court some
inconvenience, "mere inconvenience is not in itself a sufficient reason to reject as untimely a motion
to intervene as of right." McDonald v. E.J. Lavino Co., 430 F.2d 1065, 1073 (5th Cir. 1970).
164. The same factors that point to intervention of right under Rule 24(a) would argue for
permissive intervention under Rule 24(b) in the event that the court finds that petitioners for intervention have not met the Rule 24(a) requirements. In fact, in most of the employment discrimination cases at issue, whether the majority employees gained admittance to the suit via Rule 24(a) (of
right) or Rule 24(b) (permissive) would not matter. One distinction between the two parts of the
rule is that intervenors of right under part (a) of the rule may acquire the federal court's ancillary
subject matter jurisdiction over their claims, whereas permissive intervenors' claims must have an
independent basis of federal subject matter jurisdiction. See 7A CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ET AL,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE§ 1923 (1986); see also Judicial Improvements Act of 1990,
104 Stat. 5089 (Dec. 1, 1990) (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1367). Because this article envisions
petitioners for intervention whose claims arise under Title VII, the federal court has jurisdiction over
the claim without resort to principles of ancillary jurisdiction. An additional difference between
intervention of right and permissive intervention is that an order denying the former is appealable
and an order denying the latter is not. See also JAMES & HAZARD, supra note 62, § 10.17, at 553
n.22.
165. "[O]nly the absent parties can accurately measure the ... interests that they now hold and
the extent to which [those interests] could be impaired." National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 676 F.
Supp. 271, 275 (D.D.C. 1985).
166. FED. R. Crv. P. 19. Unlike most of the federal joinder rules, which permit the plaintiff to
elect whether or not to join new parties, Rule 19 empowers the defendant to compel joinder of a
party. Rule 19 is sometimes used by defendants who legitimately believe that someone needed for
the lawsuit is missing and should be joined before things go any further. Rule 19 is also frequently
used by defendants who hope to have the case dismissed by convincing the court that a nonparty
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How Rule 19 Works

The application of Rule 19 requires a two-step process. 167 In the
first step, the court must determine whether the absentee is a person
needed for just adjudication of the action, thus "necessary, under the
standards of Rule 19(a). 168 If the absentee is necessary, the court must
order the plaintiff to join the absentee in the lawsuit. 169 The second step
of the process is triggered if joinder of this "necessary" absentee is impossible. Such impossibility may result from rules of venue and personal or
subject matter jurisdiction. 170 In this second step, the court must determine whether the case should go forward despite the unfeasibility of joining the necessary absentee. If the absentee is so essential to the suit that
the suit should not, "in equity and good conscience," proceed in his absence, the absentee is deemed "indispensable," and the court must dismiss the suit. 171 If the absentee is not so crucial to the suit, he is deemed
merely necessary, but not indispensable, and the suit may proceed without him! 72
c.

Rule 19(a): Majority Employees As Necessary Parties

Under Rule 19(a), an absentee is necessary if he has an interest relating to the subject matter of the suit and if either ( 1) the disposition of the
who cannot be joined is crucial to the suit. If the defendant fails to invoke Rule 19 where appropriate, the rule requires the court to apply the rule sua sponte. Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust v.
Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 111 (1968).
167. Takeda v. Northwestern Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 765 F.2d 815, 819 (9th Cir. 1985); Pasco lnt'l
(London) Ltd. v. Stenograph Corp., 637 F.2d 496, 500 (7th Cir. 1980); LeBeau v. Libby-OwensFord Co., 484 F.2d 798, 800 (7th Cir. 1973); Freeman v. Liu, 112 F.R.D. 35, 40 (N.D. Ill. 1986);
Bedel v. Thompson, 103 F.R.D. 78, 80 (S.D. Ohio 1984).
168. 7 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 164, § 1611, at 161.
169. If the absentee is someone who should be a third-party defendant, thus joinable by the
defendant under Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, then a Rule 19 motion for joinder
is, of course, unnecessary. The defendant may, however, move for Rule 19 dismissal of the suit
because of the defendant's inability to join the third-party defendants. See infra note 171 and accompanying text.
170. Macklin v. Butler, 553 F.2d 525, 531 (7th Cir. 1977). The Rule contemplates that joinder
of the nonparty will be impossible (1) where the nonparty's joinder would destroy subject matter
jurisdiction; or (2) when the court cannot obtain personal jurisdiction over the nonparty; and (3)
when the nonparty, once joined, objects to venue. FED. R. Ctv. P. 19(a). If a nonparty is not
deemed "necessary" under section (a), then the court need never reach the Rule 19(b) issues pertaining to "indispensability," that is, whether the action should go forward in the absence of an admittedly necessary party who cannot be joined. FED. R. Ctv. P. 19.
171. Prior to the 1966 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the term "indispensable" meant, among other things, that the absentee's interests were not severable from those of one
of the parties. Washington v. United States, 87 F.2d 421, 426 (9th Cir. 1936) (quoting Shields v.
Barrow, 58 U.S. 130, 139 (1854)). Such "wooden" decision making has given way to consideration
of practical matters under the amended rule. 7 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 164, § 1607, at 86.
"The reference in revised Rule 19 to this conclusory label was not intended to codify the pre-1966
body of precedent in which particular parties were categorized as 'indispensable.'" /d. at 85. "According to the present language of Rule 19(b) the court is to invoke this label only after an evaluation
of the relevant considerations presented by the case, particularly those enumerated in the rule itself,
makes it clear that in 'equity and good conscience' the action should not proceed in his absence." !d.
172. FED. R. Ctv. P. 19(b).
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suit may keep the absentee from being able to protect this interest; 173 or
(2) the defendant in the suit may be subjected to inconsistent obligations
as a result of the absentee's attempts to protect the absentee's interest in a
subsequent lawsuit. 174 Given a collateral attack bar, majority employees
typically are necessary parties by virtue of the first of these conditions;
absent such a bar, they are necessary by virtue of the second. 175
Under either of the Rule 19(a)(2) provisions, the first inquiry is the
same as the first Rule 24 intervention inquiry-whether the absentee's
interest is cognizable under the rule. 176 Like the would-be intervenors
under Rule 24, the majority employees who are considered for Rule 19
joinder in employment discrimination cases have an interest in not being
victims of "reverse" discrimination. 177 Also as with Rule 24, some
courts incorporate into the interest requirement a requirement that the
interest be one that is truly threatened. Thus, some courts recognize a
Rule 19 interest only when a subsequent suit by the absentee to enforce
the interest is likely to succeed. 178 Courts requiring likelihood of success
173. FED. R. CIV. P. l9(a)(2)(i).
174. FED. R . CIV. P. 19(a)(2)(ii). One commentator has suggested that "a successful thirdparty attack will necessarily result in conflicting injunctions, since the judgment in the second action
will enjoin compliance with the consent decree." Kramer, supra note 1, at 333. In fact, a court may
order relief in the second suit that is logically inconsistent with the consent decrees (back wages for
example), but which does not actually require disobedience to the decree. It is unlikely that a court
would grant relief literally requiring the employer to violate the terms of another court's order or its
own order in an earlier case.
A nonparty also may be necessary if his absence makes it impossible for those present to resolve
their conflict completely. FED. R. Ctv. P. 19(a)(l). In fact, the first of the Rule 19(a) situations, in
which the parties cannot resolve matters in the nonparty's absence, is not called into play at all by
the type of employment discrimination lawsuit this article considers. This is because this portion of
Rule 19(a) contemplates a situation in which somehow the defendant literally does not possess the
means to give the plaintiff redress without the nonparty's participation. /d. 19 advisory committee
comment to 1966 amends. Usually the employment discrimination defendant can pay over to the
minority plaintiff appropriate relief, affirmative or otherwise, without the participation of the white
employees. The whites' absence does not tie the hands of the employer or the strings on the employer's pocketbook. It is thus the second subparagraph of section (a) that governs the question of
when majority employers must be deemed necessary in discrimination lawsuits.
Although the rule states generally "a party to the suit," it protects only the defendant. The
danger to the plaintiff of subsequent action by the absentee is not of concern here because the plaintiff, as the master of his suit, may unilaterally join any parties whose absence would prejudice him.
Simply put, the plaintiff is in a position to sue whomever she wishes. It is the defendant who,
involuntarily hailed into court, needs the protection of Rule 19. See, e.g. , Provident Tradesmens
Bank & Trust v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 110 (1968).
175. This generalization is offered to assist in the analysis of Rule 19 in the instant context, but
with the caveat that the inquiry under Rule 19(a) is normally a practical inquiry based on the specific
facts of each case. "Th[e] rule does not set forth a rigid or mechanical formula for decision." JTG
of Nashville v. Rhythm Band, 693 F . Supp. 623, 625 (M.D. Tenn. 1988); see also Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust, 390 U.S. at 116 n.12. Rather, the rule was "designed to encourage courts to
appraise themselves of the 'practical considerations' of each individual case in light of the policies
underlying the rule." Rhythm Band, 693 F. Supp. at 625. In the specific language of another court,
"the rule emphasizes practical consequences and its application depends on the circumstances of
each case." Takeda v. Northwestern Nat'! Life Ins. Co., 765 F.2d. 815, 819 (9th Cir. 1985).
176. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
177. But see English v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co., 465 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1972).
178. One scholar has argued that "[i]t is impossible to imagine an affirmative action case in
which other employees do not have a strong interest and an arguable legal theory. They should be
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in the future suit have held that "[s]peculation about the occurrence of a
future event ordinarily does not render all parties potentially affected by
that future event necessary or indispensable parties under Rule 19." 179
In the view of these courts, "it is clear that Rule 19(a) has never required
joinder in every case in which 'interests' of white persons may be adversely affected by a court decree terminating racially discriminatory
practices." 180 These courts suggest that a "substantial likelihood" of
prejudice is required to justify Rule 19 joinder of absentees. 181 Other
courts are more lenient. The more lenient courts that require less than a
likelihood of prevailing in the subsequent suit have relied on the language
of the rule, which speaks in terms of "possibilities." 182
As with Rule 24, courts should be reluctant to find that the interest
requirement is not met on the sole ground that the court believes that its
own decision should be upheld if the absentees challenge the decree in a
subsequent suit. Because courts invariably hope that all their orders, if
appealed, will be found to be lawful, a court's expectation that a subsequent challenge to its order would fail should not defeat the interest
requirement.
Instead, what should defeat the motion to join majority employees is
joined in every case in which plaintiffs seek more than make-whole relief for identifiable victims."
Laycock, supra note 21, at 124.
179. Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 705 F.2d 1030, 1046 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 849 (1983); LeBeau v. Libby-Owens-Ford Co., 484 F.2d 798, 802 (7th Cir. 1973) ("too
speculative to justify dismissal"). Even for those courts that permit uncertainty of success in the
majority's future suit, however, those majority employees whose suits are barred by sec. 108, Category 2 should be found not to have cognizable interests. This is because these people have, by
definition, been adequately represented in the first suit; thus, they have already had their challenges
raised and considered.
180. English, 465 F .2d at 46. This was applied to joinder of male employees in Spirt v. Teachers
Insurance & Annuity Association, 416 F. Supp. 1019, 1022 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), a sex discrimination
case.
181. Coastal Modular Corp. , 635 F.2d at 1108. Rule 19(a) actually speaks in terms of practical
impairment, rather than legal impairment. FED. R. CIV. P. 19(a). It might, therefore, be argued
that even those majority employees who never would have a viable cause of action-because the
decree was verifiably lawful-should be deemed interest-impaired. That is, the decree indeed will
harm them, by taking job advantages away, but will do so only in a way consistent with governing
precedent. Nevertheless, some courts require not only that the absentee have a future suit, but that
the suit be likely to succeed. See supra note 179.
182. In fact, the term "may" in Rule 19 refers to the possibility that the absentee's ability to
protect his interest may be impaired, not to the question whether the interest at stake is threatened
enough. Under Firefighters it no longer should be possible for the intervenor to force the other
parties to adjudicate fully their own dispute. Under Firefighters, the intervenor has no power to
block settlement by withholding his consent. A number of cases before Firefighters had reached a
contrary result. See United States v. City of Miami, 664 F.2d 435 (5th Cir. 1981) (en bane); Culbreath v. Dukakis, 630 F.2d 15, 22 (1st Cir. 1980); United States v. Simmonds Precision Prods., Inc.,
319 F. Supp. 620, 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Kramer, supra note 1, at 353 n.l35 (citing Sanguine, Ltd. v.
United States Dep't of Interior, 798 F.2d 389, 390-91 (lOth Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1054
( 1987)). In the words of one court, judges "need not conclusively determine how collateral estoppel
would operate in future litigation. 'Rule 19 speaks to possible harm, not only to certain harm.' "
Takeda v. Northwestern Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 765 F.2d 815, 821 (9th Cir. 1985) (citations omitted)
(quoting Aguilar v. Los Angeles County, 751 F.2d 1089, 1094 (9th Cir. 1985)). Several courts have
used this language to support joinder of absentees based in part upon a "significant possibility" of
prejudice. See Takeda, 765 F.2d at 821.
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the Rule 19(a) impairment requirement. Once it is established that the
absentee has a cognizable, adequately threatened interest in the suit, the
defendant must further establish under the remaining portion of Rule
19(a) either that the absentee's ability to protect that interest may be
impaired by disposition of the suit or that the absentee is likely to bring a
subsequent action that will subject the defendant to inconsistent obligations. It is these aspects of Rule 19(a) that will cause the failure of a Rule
19 motion to join absent majority employees.
(i) Rule 19(a)(2)(i)
Rule 19(a)(2)(i) is virtually identical to Rule 24(a)(2). Both require
joinder if the absentee claims an interest relating to the subject of the
action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence
may "as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that
interest." 183 Unlike Rule 24 intervention, however, the goal of this portion of Rule 19 is to obligate those present in the suit to protect the
absentee. 184
The leading case on the application of Rule 19, Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust v. Patterson, 185 suggests that the obligation of courts
to use Rule 19 to protect against such prejudice is of due process dimensions.186 As a lower court has stated, "(a] court must protect the inter183. FED. R. Ctv. P. 19(a)(2)(i). See supra note 176 and accompanying text. Prejudice to the
nonparty and prejudice to the defendant may appear at first glance to amount to one and the same
thing. That is, one may expect that if prejudice to the nonparty results from judgment in the suit,
then the nonparty is likely to bring a suit against the defendant. That suit, in tum, may result in an
inconsistent obligation being imposed upon the defendant; thus prejudicing the defendant. Prejudice
to the nonparty· does not, however, equal prejudice to the defendant. The rule speaks, not of impairment of the absentee's interest, but rather of impairment of his ability to protect his interest. FED.
R. Ctv. P. 19(aX2)(i). The rule envisions and protects against a situation in which the nonparty will
not be able to succeed in a subsequent suit to recover whatever that first suit irretrievably took from
him. The nonparty envisioned by the rule thus poses no threat of inconsistent obligations to the
defendant, for the rule protects the nonparty only if he cannot prevail in the second suit. Conversely,
a nonparty who can succeed in imposing inconsistent obligations upon the defendant via a subsequent lawsuit (our concern in the prejudice to defendant prong of this provision) is not a nonparty
whose ability to protect his own interest is impaired, inasmuch as he can succeed in the subsequent
suit.
184. Those nonparties whose interests arguably are affected are in a better position to know
whether any potential effects of the decree are important enough to warrant filing suit. See House
Hearings, supra note 86, at 464 (statement of Prof. Larry Kramer) (stressing that traditional route in
Anglo-American litigation system is to leave burden of filing claim with nonparty). As one court has
stated, "the interests of an unjoined party are especially vulnerable in that they are not vigorously
asserted by counsel before the court. As a result, it is possible that the true nature and extent of
those interests may not be explored until after they are irreparably prejudiced." Boles v. Greeneville
Housing Auth., 468 F.2d 476, 478 n.3 (6th Cir. 1972).
185. 390 u.s. 102 (1968).
186. /d. at 123. The Provident Court stated: "Neither Rule 19, nor we, today, mean to foreclose an examination in future cases to see whether an injustice is being, or might be, done to the
substantive, or, for that matter, constitutional rights of an outsider by proceeding with a particular
case." /d.
The burdens of joining all "necessary" parties in these cases might be alleviated by joining
several majority employees as representatives of a defendant class under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, although use of this device may be so fraught with difficulties as to be unwork-
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ests of the parties not before it to avoid possible prejudicial effect; failure
of a court to protect those interests by joinder may amount to a violation
of due process." 187
Like Rule 24, Rule 19(a)(2)(i) does not, by its terms, require legal
impairment of the interest, but only practical impairment. Some courts
have emphasized that "it is not necessary, under Rule 19, that [the absentee] would be bound by the judgment in a technical sense, but is enough
that as a practical matter [his] rights will be affected." 188 Nevertheless,
other courts have relied on the fact that the absentee is not legally bound
by a particular decision to support the conclusion that the absentee is not
a necessary or indispensable party. 189 Under either approach, courts
would see an absolute collateral attack bar as impairment of the majority
employees' ability to protect their interest. Such a bar, in effect, would
render the absent majority employees bound by the decree, and this binding effect entirely eliminates the absentees' ability to protect their interest
if they are not joined. The protections built into both categories of section 108, however, suggest that courts should not deem such barred majority employees to have met the impairment requirement.
Those who fall within the first section 108 category do not meet the
impaired ability requirement because they have, by definition, had and
declined the requisite opportunity to protect their interests. Majority
employees are not barred by the first category of section 108 unless they
have been given notice and an opportunity to object. 190 A number of
courts have recognized that denying joinder does not impair an absentee's interest if the absentee failed to take advantage of an opportunity to
intervene. 191 Because anyone who qualifies as a necessary party under
the Rule 19(a) criteria also would qualify as an intervenor of right under
Rule 24, 192 we may assume that any Category l absentee has forgone an
opportunity to petition for intervention by the time the court applies
Rule 19. 193 Thus, the absentees' ability to protect their interests is not
impaired.
With regard to the Category 2 bar, there is similar reason to find
able. Laycock, supra note 21, at 147-48 n.39; Strickler, supra note 38, at 1596-98; Recktenwald,
supra note II, at 175-76.
187. R.J. Williams Co. v. Fort Belknap Housing Auth., 92 F.R.D. 17, 21 (D. Mont. 1981).
188. JTG of Nashville v. Rhythm Band, 693 F. Supp. 623, 627 (M.D. Tenn. 1988); 3A MOORE
& KENNEDY, supra note 89, 1!19.07[2.-1], at 19-103; see also NLRB v. Doug Neal Management Co.,
620 F.2d 1133, 1139 (6th Cir. 1980).
189. Munoz v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 633 F. Supp. 564, 566 (D. Colo. 1986); see also
Shelton v. Exxon Corp., 843 F.2d 212, 218 (5th Cir. 1988).
190. As discussed earlier, the terms of sec. 108 describe an "opportunity to object," rather than
"an opportunity to intervene," see supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text, but this article argues
that intervention is the only proper mechanism for them to be heard.
191. If courts treat the opportunity to petition for intervention as equivalent to an opportunity
to present objections, the result might be different.
192. See FED. R. Clv. P. 24 advisory committee's note to 1966 amends.
193. There may be some exceptions to this proposition when a majority employee has learned so
recently that his interests are impaired that he has not yet had an opportunity to intervene.
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that the majority employees' ability to protect their interests is not impaired for purposes of Rule 19. Category 2 bars only absentees whose
interests have been represented adequately by another party who challenged the decree. 194 Rather than being impaired, then, the ability of this
category of barred employees to protect their interests has, by definition,
become a moot issue because their interests already are protected adequately. Accordingly, Category 2 absentees also should not be necessary
under Rule 19(a).
By contrast, the third category of majority employees, who would
have been barred under the 1990 version of the Act, but are not barred
under the 1991 Act, would have met the Rule 19(a) impairment requirement. This category includes absentees as to whom constitutionally adequate efforts at notice had been made but who had not received actual
notice and an opportunity to be heard. 195 With regard to these people,
joinder under Rule 19(a) would have been appropriate if possible, but it
probably would not have been possible.
Those who would have been barred under Category 3 of the 1990
Act would never have received notice, though efforts at notice had been
made. This category would have included people whom the parties to
the suit were unable to find. Presumably, the bound absentees would
have included those who had not applied yet for positions or begun
working as employees of the defendant. Because these people could not
have been identified, they could not have been joined under Rule 19(a).
For absentees such as these, who were necessary but could not be joined,
the 1990 version of the rule would have required determination of
whether they were so important as to be indispensable, requiring dismissal of the suit in their absence under Rule 19(b). This issue is discussed
below in subpart d.
(ii) Rule 19(a)(2)(ii)

The other relevant portion of Rule 19(a)(2) also would counsel
against joinder of the majority employees who may be affected by section
108 of the 1991 Act. This subsection concerns prejudice to the defendant, rather than to the absentee. Rule 19(a)(2)(ii) requires that the absentees be joined if they "claim[] an interest relating to the subject matter of
the action and [are] so situated that the disposition of the action in [their]
absence may ... leave [the employer] subject to a substantial risk of
incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of the absentees' claimed interest." 196 In situations where collateral
194. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
195. See supra note 55.
196. The prospect of "multiple" suits against the employer not accompanied by a probability of
success does not bring Rule 19(a) into play. The same trial judge who considers the Rule 19 motion
will usually conduct the fairness hearing. If the judge expects the fairness hearing to permit the
judge to ascertain whether government legal standards are violated, see infra note 219, the judge
logically would expect any subsequent suit challenging the decree as unlawful to fail. The prospect
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attack is available, the employer is at risk for inconsistent judgments.
The absentees could bring a suit to challenge the decree, and that second
suit could result in a conflicting judgment to the effect that the decree in
the first suit was unlawful. Rule 19, however, does not require joinder to
avoid inconsistent obligations when joinder would not eliminate the
problem anyway. Because the majority employees, if they were joined,
could not, under Firefighters, be forced to concur in any consent decree,
their joinder technically would not eliminate the possibility of inconsistent results, and thus would not be required by Rule 19} 97 Majority
employees who are barred by section 108, however, generally would be
bound by any judgment or order resolving a claim of employment discrimination, regardless of their objections to it, and consequently could
not subsequently subject the employer to inconsistent obligations. This
prong of Rule 19, then, would not render the majority employees
necessary.
d.

Rule 19(b)

If the court nevertheless determines that the majority employees are
necessary under Rule 19(a), then the court must order the plaintiff to join
of majority employees who can present substantial new facts or new arguments in the second suit
does not undermine this premise. Even if the majority employees are able to bring new evidence to
bear in the second court, the majority employees are limited to challenging the adequacy of the
evidentiary foundation for the first trial court's approval of the decree or for the defendant's acceptance of the decree. See infra note 219.
Our scenario should not fall automatically within the ambit of the "inconsistent obligation"
prong because the term "inconsistent obligation" has a narrow definition, requiring more than simple logical inconsistency. Rather, the results of the two cases must be practically inconsistent or
mutually exclusive. In short, the employer literally must be incapable of complying with both at the
same time. In the employment discrimination context, it is probable that any inconsistent judgment
in the second case is merely logically inconsistent, but not practically inconsistent, with the consent
decree. Assume that the second court finds that the affirmative action plan embodied in the consent
decree does not comply with Weber. Its holding is thus logically inconsistent with the consent decree that, ideally, the entering court deemed consistent with Weber. If the court does find a violation
of Weber, it nevertheless may grant appropriate relief not inconsistent with the decree. The employer may be doubly liable. Cf. W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, lnt'l Union of the United
Rubber Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 767 (1983). For example, it now may have to promote all the whites
who would have received promotions absent the affirmative action plan. This does not mean that the
employer must demote the minority employees who benefited from the plan, but rather that the
employer must promote more people than it had intended to promote.
Absentee majority employees were much more likely to meet the requirements of Rule
19(a)(2)(ii) under Martin v. Wilks than under the 1991 Act. The provisions of sec. 108 should
prohibit most absentee challenges to a judgment or order resolving an employment discrimination
claim. Because the barred absentees never could challenge the resolution of the claim in subsequent
litigation, there is virtually no risk that persons already parties could incur double, multiple, or
inconsistent obligations. As a result, sec. 108 will eliminate almost completely this prong of Rule
19(a) from the equation in employment discrimination actions.
197. Dyke v. Gulf Oil Corp., 601 F.2d 557 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1979), rev'd, 734 F.2d 797
(Temp. Emer. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 852 (1984); see also Rochester Methodist Hosp. v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 728 F.2d 1006 (8th Cir. 1984); 3A MooRE & KENNEDY, supra note 89, ~ 19.07,
at 19-123. Nevertheless, because, by the terms of sec. 108, majority employees joined under Rule 19
would be before the judge who entered the decree, the chance of consistency between the results of
the consent decree negotiations and the subsequent adjudication of the majority employees' claim is
enhanced.
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them. 198 In some instances, however, the nonparties' joinder cannot be
accomplished. The reason for this may be that the court lacks personal
jurisdiction over the nonparties, that their joinder would destroy diversity jurisdiction, or that, once joined, the nonparties raise a valid objection to venue. 199 The reason also may be, as suggested above, that the
absentees in question cannot be found or even identified. When joinder is
thus impossible, Rule 19 directs the court to decide whether to proceed
without the absentees by exercising its discretion guided by the criteria
set forth in part (b) of Rule 19.
Rule 19(b) sets forth four criteria pertaining to the future of the suit
and requires the court to consider whether these and other "interests"
dictate that the case should go forward in the necessary party's absence. 200 In the alternative, the rule permits the court to decide that, "in
equity and good conscience," the case should be dismissed so that it can
be brought where all necessary parties can be joined properly. 201 Thus,
"Rule 19(b) is to be applied pragmatically, with a focus on a realistic
analysis of the facts of each case." 202 Under Rule 19, the interests to be
weighed are as follows:
( 1) the extent of prejudice to the absentee or parties that will occur
as a result of th~ court's rendering a judgment without the absentee;
(2) the extent to which protective provisions in the judgment can
lessen such prejudice;
(3) whether the court will be able truly to resolve the matter without the absentee; and
(4) whether the plaintiff will have a forum if the action is dismissed
for nonjoinder. 203
The first of the four criteria, prejudice, ~ncorporates a reconsideration of the Rule 19(a) criteria: prejudice to the absentee or to the defendant from inconsistent judgments. 204 Upon Rule 19(b) analysis, the
district court again weighs these Rule 19(a) factors with greater discre198. Joinder in this circumstance is mandatory, not discretionary. FED. R. Ctv. P. 19(a);
Macklin v. Butler, 553 F.2d 525, 531 (7th Cir. 1917); Carl Tobias, Rule 19 and the Public Rights
Exception to Party Joinder, 65 N.C. L. REv. 745, 771 (1987).
199. 7 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 164, § 1607, at 84.
200. FED. R. CIV. P. 19(b).
The plaintiff has the right to "control" his own litigation and to choose his own forum. This
"right" is, however, like all other rights, "defined" by the rights of others. Thus, the defendant
has the right to be safe from needless multiple litigation and from incurring avoidable inconsistent obligations. Likewise the interests of the outsider who cannot be joined must be considered. Finally there is the public interest and the interest the court has in seeing that insofar as
possible the litigation will be both effective and expeditious.
Lamar Haddox Contractor, Inc. v. Potashnick, 552 F. Supp. 11, 14 (M.D. La. 1982) (quoting Schutten v. Shell Oil Co., 421 F.2d 869, 873 (5th Cir. 1970)).
201. FED. R. Ctv. P. 19(b).
202. Schmidt v. E.N. Maisel & Assocs., lOS F.R.D. 157, 159 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (citing Provident
Tradesmens Bank & Trust v. Patterson, 390 U .S. 102 (1968)).
203. FED. R. CIV. P. 19(b).
204. As discussed above, the Supreme Court in Provident stated that prejudice to the plaintiff is
not an issue. If it were, the plaintiff would have joined the absentee herself. Provident Tradesmens
Bank & Trust v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, Ill (1968).
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tion, and may throw additional considerations into the balance. For the
same reasons that the collateral attack bar rendered the majority employees unable to protect their interests under Rule 19(a), they here may be
deemed prejudiced for purposes of Rule 19(b). Likewise, for the same
reason that safeguards in the second category of section 108 provided
protection against such impairment for purposes of Rule 19(a), they do
so for purposes of Rule 19(b) as well. Under the vetoed 1990 legislation,
by contrast, the Category 3 absentees would have met the Rule 19(b)
prejudice criterion. Absentees who received no notice and whose interests were not represented would have been indispensable; and the inability to join them would have required dismissal of the case.
The second Rule 19(b) criterion, by contrast, favors proceeding in
the absence of majority employees. This criterion effectively provides
that any prejudice found under Rule 19(b) may be discounted to the extent that it can be lessened by protective provisions in the judgment.
Rule 19(b), then, goes much further than Rule 24(a) in the leeway it
gives the court to decide for itself whether its own decision will be adequate to protect the interests of the absentee. This is a key consideration
for our purposes. As discussed below, the judge presiding over the consent decree process has an opportunity to consider precisely the question
of how to tailor the decree so that it does not prejudice absentees. 205 This
judge has the latitude to approve only those portions of the parties'
agreement that comport with governing legal standards.206 If a consent
decree is legal, then the employer would win in any subsequent suit, if
subsequent suits to challenge the decree were permitted. Proceeding
with the suit in his absence thus would not prejudice the absentee who
will not be allowed a collateral challenge because the foreclosed challenge would not meet with success if it were available. 207 The process
proposed below to be followed at the fairness nearing, therefore, is im205. Adequate protection of [minority] rights under Title VII may necessitate . . . some adjustment of the rights of [majority] employees. The Court must be free to deal equitably with
conflicting interests of (majority] employees in order to shape remedies that will most effectively
protect and redress the rights of [minority] victims of discrimination.
Vogler v. McCarty, Inc., 451 F.2d 1236, 1238-39 (5th Cir. 1971) (entering remedial order, rather
than consent decree).
206. Courts need not fear challenges to legal affirmative action:
[T]he courts cannot be deterred by fears of potential adverse impact upon beneficiaries of a
discriminatory status quo. There can be no vested interest in an unlawful practice.
Since the [majority] cannot legitimately assert a protectable interest, they need not be
joined pursuant to Rule 19(a) .... If the challenged . .. program is found to violate the laws
prohibiting . . . discrimination and defendants are ordered to alter its operation, the affected
[majority] could not succeed in a claim asserted against good faith compliance with such a
decree. Accordingly, the (majority] need not be joined.
Spirt v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of Am., 416 F. Supp. 1019, 1023 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). Moreover, because any subsequent challenge would, under the terms of sec. 108, be brought in the decreeentering court, the judge in that court is in a particularly good position to assure that no prejudice
accrues. Cf. Western Md. Ry. Co. v. Harbor Ins. Co., 910 F.2d 960 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
207. Admittedly, there may be a gap between what is legal and what the absentee could achieve
if he were joined in the suit. Perhaps the absentee could convince the court to approve a less drastic
plan.
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portant not only to protect majority employees and consequently the finality of the decree, but also to protect the original suit from dismissal if
necessary absentees cannot be joined. Absent such protection, the original suit and the resultant consent decree, which the bar is designed to
protect, are threatened by the bar itself.
The third Rule 19(b) criterion is the "adequacy of a judgment rendered without the absentee.''208 This refers to the public's interest in
having the whole dispute resolved at once, rather than to the plaintiff's
interest in receiving complete relief. 209 When collateral attack is available, this factor points to joinder to protect the courts against additional
lawsuits. If the section 108 bar criteria are met, so that subsequent suits
are barred, the objective of having the whole dispute resolved at once is
automatically met without joinder of the majority employees because the
bar renders the first suit the only suit. 210 The first suit will, by definition
under section 108, resolve the whole dispute at once. 211 Given a collateral attack bar, application of this part of Rule 19(b) invariably should
favor proceeding without the majority employee absentees.
The fourth Rule 19(b) criterion is "inadequacy of alternative
fora." 212 In applying this criterion, the judge considers whether this is
the only forum available to the plaintiff so that dismissal of the suit for
want of the missing party effectively will deprive the plaintiff of any forum at all. This would be the case where, for example, jurisdiction over
the named defendants could not be obtained in any court other than the
forum court. It also would be the case where the necessary parties could
not be joined because they could not be identified or located. A ruling
that these unidentifiable absentees were indispensable, requiring dismissal of the suit, would mean that the plaintiff would have no forum, because the absentees would not suddenly become identifiable when the
plaintiff sought to file the suit in a different forum. With respect to any
majority employees found necessary under Rule 19(a), this aspect of
Rule 19(b) counsels against dismissal. This criterion of Rule 19, moreover, comes into play only to save a case when other Rule 19(b) factors
have pointed to dismissaJ.2 13 It never can weigh in favor of dismissal.
208. FED. R. Ctv. P. 19(b).
209. Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 111 (1968).
210. This will occur when other majority employees in the suit adequately represent the interests of the absentees or else the absentees have, without being joined, already had a "reasonable
opportunity to present objections."
·
211. One might argue that the majority's piece of the suit is being left out, so that there is not a
complete resolution of the case. But, the majority interest is considered as a question of prejudice
under the first Rule 19(b) criterion. This third criterion has to do with efficiency, not fairness.
212. FED. R. CIV. P. 19(b).
213. Pasco lnt'l (London) Ltd. v. Stenograph Corp., 637 F.2d 496, 501 (7th Cir. 1980). The
court in Pasco notes that "the availability of an alternative forum is primarily of negative significance" (absence weighs heavily, if not conclusively, against dismissal, while presence does not weigh
so heavily). /d. at 501 n.9. Some cases show that unavailability of an alternative forum will cause a
court not to join an otherwise indispensable party. If there is no alternative, the party is not indispensable and the inquiry ends-if there is an alternative, this fact is not determinative and the inquiry continues. "(T]he availability of an alternative forum, standing alone, [is not) a sufficient
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Only if other factors point to dismissal must the court consider whether
dismissal would have the effect of putting the plaintiff out of court entirely. If the court has found that it can tailor a consent decree to avoid
prejudice to the absentee, then application of this last criterion serves
only to reinforce that decision.
Rule 19 analysis thus should yield a decision not to join absent majority employees under 19(a) and not to dismiss a suit for the inability to
join them under 19(b). Section 108 provides protections that render the
absentees unprejudiced by the case's proceeding in their absence. If the
majority employees are deemed necessary, the fact that the identity of the
absentees is unknown makes them unjoinable. Rule 19(b) analysis then
must be undertaken, and the outcome should tum primarily on analysis
under the first two Rule 19(b) criteria. If majority employee collateral
challenges are barred, the court's ability to design a decree that curtails
any prejudice to the absentee should resolve the Rule 19(b) inquiry. The
outcome of this prejudice curtailment analysis in tum hinges largely on
what can be expected to happen in the fairness hearing. Because the
fairness hearing provides an ideal opportunity for implementing protections, indispensability findings can be averted by routine proper structuring of that hearing. The next section discusses mechanisms to achieve
that end.
B.
1.

Approval of the Decree

Wilks; Two Bites at the Apple

Pursuant to Rule 24 or, perhaps Rule 19, our hypothetical majority
employees now have been joined as parties in the original minority suit
against the employer. There is some room for doubt about what, exactly,
they should do once joined. Part of the answer to this question traditionally has turned on the timing of the majority employees' joinder.214 If
they came into the suit prior to entry of the decree, they might be permitted to present their objections to the proposed decree at a "fairness hearing." Traditionally, the fairness hearing provides merely an informal
opportunity for nonparties to the decree to be heard on the question of
whether the decree treats them fairly. 215 If permitted to intervene after
the entry of the decree, they might mount a challenge comparable to
what could be brought in a collateral lawsuit, with the court fully adjudireason for deciding that the action should not proceed among the parties before the court." /d. at
501 (citing Bio-Analytical Servs., Inc. v. Edgewater Hosp., Inc., 565 F.2d 450, 453 (7th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 820 (1978) (citing Bonnet v. Trustees ofSch. of Township 41 N., 563 F.2d 831,
833 (7th Cir. 1977))).
214. "Joinder" refers to both Rule 19 joinder and Rule 24 intervention.
215. See Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 775 (1989); Firefighters v. Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 529
(1986). Some judges delve into the question of whether the decree comports with substantive law.
See, e.g., Firefighters, 478 U.S. at 511-12. Although judges need not adjudicate the claims in order
to enter a consent decree, they usually do more than merely rubber stamp the decree. Kramer, supra
note 1, at 333, n.53 (citing Judith Resnick, Judging Consent, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 43, 93-96).
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eating the question of whether the decree complies with the law. 216
Under the regime of Wilks, majority employees enjoyed two bites at
the apple. Such employees first could attempt informally at the fairness
hearing to avoid entry of the consent decree. If they were unsuccessful at
that hearing, no binding effect on them resulted. They then could litigate
formally, in the first suit or in an independent suit, the question of
whether the consent decree entered over their objections violated the
law. 217 This two-bite-at-the-apple scheme resulted from the quasi-adjudicative, nonbinding nature of the fairness hearing. 218 If the fairness
hearing had been a full adjudication to which the majority employees
were party, they would have been bound to its outcome by res judicata.
Because of the informal nature of the fairness hearing, however, majority
employees were not bound and were free to challenge the decree a second
·
time.
Section 108 precludes the majority employees' second bite at the apple only to the extent that the second bite takes place in an independent
lawsuit. If the majority employees' challenge occurs as a continuation of
the original minority suit, then the majority employees retain their two
bites. 219 This is because the court may hold a traditional informal fairness hearing before entering the decree and still fully adjudicate the majority employees' claim after entry of the decree. Although the current
structure of consent decree cases may permit these two opportunities,
considerations of efficiency and fairness to other interested parties suggest that courts should afford only one hearing. A single fairness hearing
can serve as the vehicle not only for airing general fairness arguments but
216. This article refers to the court's treatment of challanges raised prior to entry of the decree
as "preview" ofthe decree and to the court's treatment of challenges raised after entry as "review" of
the decree.
217. Under Firefighters, once the original plaintiff and defendant have resolved their dispute, an
intervenor who does not join in the consent decree remains in the case. Firefighters, 478 U.S. at 529.
The intervenor can press its challenge, possibly following amendment of its complaint, and receive a
full adjudication on the intervenor's claims. As discussed above, the Firefighters Court questioned
whether it might have been too late by the time that case reached the Supreme Court for the intervenors to receive full adjudication on the merits. /d. at 530. Once the dispute between the original
parties has been resolved, however, there is a potential argument that the intervenor's claim does not
meet the Article Ill case or controversy requirement. See Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 63-65
(1986); Strickler, supra note 38, at 1588 n.l36. But see Cooper, supra note 73, at 172. See generally
Tobias, supra note 97. Once the consent decree is entered, and the minority plaintiffs drop from the
case, a case or controversy arises precisely because of the consent decree's terms that create a case
between the intervenors and the employer.
218. For those majority employees who intervened in the original suit, some courts have assumed that, in addition to raising claims that the settlement violated the majority employees' rights,
the intervenors also could force an adjudication of the plaintiff's claim against the defendant. See
Kramer, supra note l, at 353 n.l35. As discussed below, there may be a significant difference between what the majority employees litigate as their claim and what the plaintiff would litigate in his
claim. See supra note 213 and accompanying text; infra notes 248-50 and accompanying text.
219. The only restriction that sec. 108 imposes is that the challenge must come in the decree
suit, rather than collaterally, and the normal Rule 24 intervention requirements must be met. The
Firefighters ruling, then, that the intervenors or other parties are free to protest consent decrees,
continues to mean that majority intervenors in the first suit are free to mount challenges in that suit
to any decree, even after the decree is entered.
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also for fully adjudicating the legality of the proposed decree. Such adjudication would resolve the majority's claims and would create a res judicata effect once and for all.
This proposal inspires the question: what is gained by settlement of
the case if prior to entry of the consent decree the whole matter must be
adjudicated anyway? The answer depends on one's definition of "the
whole matter" and changes depending on whether one means the plaintiff's case or the majority employees' case. The plaintiff's case consists of
proof that the defendant has discriminated and the plaintiff thereby has
been injured. As explained below, the majority employees' case consists,
at most, of proof that the plaintiff does not have adequate evidence to
make a prima facie case or else that any proposed affirmative action unnecessarily trammels the rights of the majority. 220
This article does not advocate that the fairness hearing should entail
full adjudication of the merits of plaintiffs' claims. That would defeat the
entire concept of consent decrees, which are by definition based upon
consent instead of adjudication. 221 Rather, it advocates that courts
should employ in preview of the decree the same principles the Supreme
Court has already developed for post hoc challenges to consent decrees.
This would provide essentially the protections that were heretofore provided by collateral attack and would assure a single court proceeding for
consideration of the consent decree. 222
The envisioned fairness hearing thus only faintly resembles the fairness hearing of the past. The hearing contemplated would provide joined
majority employees a full and fair opportunity to be heard on their
claims and would result in the same res judicata effect that would bind a
postdecree intervenor or collateral attacker of the decree who litigated
the decree's lawfulness. 223 How such a hearing might operate is dis220. Compare Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 632 (1987) (imbalance in treatment need not be sufficient to support prima facie case) with id. at 653 (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(prima facie evidence suggests need for remedial action).
221. A hybrid scheme in which the court would adjudicate the prior discrimination predicate
and the parties would consent to the affirmative action plan as a remedy is a possibility. This would
not work, however, when the most burdensome part of employment discrimination litigation is the
ascertainment of the employer's past behavior. But see Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,
371-72 (1977). By contrast, assessing possible alternative remedies and their impact on third parties
is a simpler matter for adjudication. /d.
222. This single hearing would be a solution to both the problem of how to protect majority
employees who are not permitted to attack decrees collaterally under sec. 108 and to the current
interminability of litigation that would be spawned by the availability of collateral attack to those
not barred by sec. 108. See In re Birmingham Reverse Discrimination Employment Litig., 833 F.2d
1492, 1494-95 (lith Cir. 1987), aff'd sub nom. Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989); Ibarra v. Texas
Employment Comm'n, 823 F.2d 873, 878-79 (5th Cir. 1987); Vanguards of Cleveland v. City of
Cleveland, 753 F.2d 479, 484 (6th Cir. 1985), aff'd, 478 U.S. 501 (1986); Culbreath v. Dukakis, 630
F.2d 15, 23 (lst Cir. 1980).
223. To say that the majority employees could press their claims at this predecree stage presupposes that the court would deem them to have claims at that juncture. As stated above, some courts
presently would not permit the majority employees to press a claim that the decree was unlawful
until such time as these employees were actually denied promotions or otherwise injured by the
decree. See supra note 103 and accompanying text. A court that will not permit such predecree
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cussed in subpart 2 below. The question of how to protect the unidentified, unrepresented majority who are not barred by section 108 in order
to avert subsequent challenges to the decree is discussed in subpart 3
below.
2.

Expand the Fairness Hearing-One Bite Retained

Traditionally, fairness hearings preceding the entry of a consent decree are advisory, rather than adjudicative. The court may, but need not,
consider some or all of the substantive factors that the court would review if the consent decree were challenged subsequently by majority employees ultimately injured by the affirmative action adopted in the
decree. 224 If the fairness hearing convinces the court that the decree does
not comport with applicable law or notions of fairness, then the court
either modifies or does not enter the decree. 225 If majority employees do
not succeed in persuading the court not to enter the decree, they are
powerless, under Firefighters, to forestall entry of the decree. Under section 108, they should be permitted to litigate subsequently the decree's
legality.
a.

Firefighters Guidance on Consent Decree Review and Preview

In addition to having established that the majority employees cannot block the decree, Firefighters also is noteworthy for having identified
what substantive standards should govern a court's post hoc review of a
consent decree that is challenged collaterally. These are precisely the
same standards that govern voluntary employer affirmative action plans
in which the court has played no role at all: the United Steelworkers v.
Weber standards. 226 The Weber standards focus on whether the affected
job categories in which advantages are being given to minorities tradiclaims to be asserted will, of course, be unable to meet the goal of predecree adjudication of the
majority's claim.
224. See Firefighters v. Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 508 (1986) (at two-day hearing Court considered intervenors' objections to use of minority promotional goals, to nine-year life of decree, and to
exclusion of union from negotiations).
225. See generally id.
226. Jd. at 517-18 (citing United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979)). As will be discussed below, Weber has evolved into the standard for reviewing voluntary affirmative action plans
adopted by private employers, and Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267 (1986),
subsequently established the standards for review of such plans adopted by public (government)
employers. For simplicity's sake, the standards are referred to together as the Weber standards,
although as this article elucidates later there are differences between the two standards. See infra
notes 226-47 and accompanying text.
Applying Weber to consent decree affirmative action is entirely consistent with the Weber case
itself, which involved a "voluntary" plan only inasmuch as it involved a plan not ordered expressly
by a court. The defendant in Weber adopted an affirmative action plan only when confronted with
legal pressure from the Department of Labor and possible Title VII liability to blacks. See PAUL
COX, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 13-2 (1987) (citing Weber V. Kaiser Aluminum & Chern.
Corp., 563 F.2d. 216, 230 (5th Cir. 1977) (Wisdom, J., dissenting), rev'd sub nom. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979), and Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chern. Corp., 415 F. Supp
761, 765 (E.D. La. 1976), aff'd, 563 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1977), rev'd sub nom. United Steelworkers v.
Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 209 n.9 (1979)).
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tionally have been racially imbalanced and segregated and whether the
affirmative action plan is, in effect, narrowly tailored. 227
In establishing that Weber provides the guiding principles for review
of consent decree affirmative action plans, Firefighters also illuminates
the framework for application of those principles. Firefighters does not
contemplate that the court will apply the Weber standards at the time it
enters the consent decree. The parties advocating entry of the decree
need not at that time affirmatively demonstrate the decree's compliance
with Weber in order to acquire the court's approval. Only when the decree is challenged must the court apply Weber, and when that occurs it is
the challenger of the decree who bears the burden of showing the decree
to be unlawful under Weber. 228
In her concurrence in Firefighters, however, Justice O'Connor argued that the Weber analysis should play some role when the decree is
entered, and not just when it is attacked subsequently. 229 In her view,
when a court is deciding at a fairness hearing whether to enter a consent
decree, the proper standards under which to challenge it are those of
Weber. 230 Justice O'Connor explained that any pre-entry majority challengers should seek to prove noncompliance with Weber and that, even if
no majority employees challenged the decree, "a court should not approve a consent decree that on its face provides for racially preferential
treatment that would clearly violate" Weber and other governing
precedent. 231
Thus, Firefighters has several significant implications for the review
and preview of employment discrimination consent decrees. It makes
clear that a trial court does not need to adjudicate fully the question of
whether a consent decree comports with Weber before the trial court
enters the decree. It further confirms that Weber is, indeed, the standard
that governs review of consent decree affirmative action plans, and, in
Justice O'Connor's concurrence, suggests that Weber applies before entry
of the decree as well. The next two subparts of this article discuss what a
court should do-short of full adjudication of the plaintiff's case against
the defendant-when it is deciding whether to enter a decree, and what,
exactly, Weber and related cases require of affirmative action resolutions.
b.

Post Hoc Review Standards

As O'Connor's concurrence in Firefighters explains, and as some
227. See Weber, 443 U.S. at 208-09.
228. Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 626 (1987) (citing Wygant, 476 U.S. at
272-78) (burden of proof on party who challenges affirmative action plan); Firefighters, 478 U.S. at
522-23 (affirmative action plan's compliance with Weber to be assessed when the plan is challenged);
id. at 531 (O'Connor, J., concu.ring) (agreeing with the Court that decision on whether plan violates
Weber may be reserved until such time as plan is challenged).
229. Firefighters, 478 U.S. at 531 (O' Connor, J., concurring).
230. /d.
231. /d.
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courts already have agreed, 232 the concepts that traditionally govern post
hoc review of affirmative action plans may and should be implemented at
the fairness hearing to achieve more efficiently the same just ends. 233
What standards govern the review-and here the preview-of affirmative
action plans turns to some extent on who adopted the plan: a government employer or a private employer. Both the Equal Protection Clause
and Title VII govern government employers; private employers are governed only by Title VII (and any applicable state law).
The standards for judging private employers' voluntary affirmative
action plans were first set forth by the United States Supreme Court in
1979 in United Steelworkers v. Weber 234 referred to above. In Weber, a
white employee challenged an affirmative action plan for basing employment preferences on race. 235 The Supreme Court established that affirmative action plans, although facially contravening the Title VII
prohibition against basing employment decisions on race, do not necessarily violate Title VII. 236 The Weber Court held that voluntary affirmative action is permissible when undertaken to "eliminate conspicuous
racial imbalance in traditionally segregated job categories. " 237 According to Weber, the plan must be tailored to this remedial purpose and
must not needlessly "trammel" the rights of majority employees. 238
In a concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun emphasized that the
Court's decision permits affirmative action under Title VII, even when
the employer itself has not even arguably violated Title VII.2 39 Rather,
232. Kirkland v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Servs., 711 F.2d 1117 (2d Cir. 1983);
United States v. City of Miami, 664 F.2d 435, 441 (5th Cir. 1981) (en bane).
233. Firefighters, 478 U.S. at 531 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
234. 443 u.s. 193 (1979).
235. The preferences at issue in Weber were places in a newly established craft training program. /d. at 197.
236. The Supreme Court stated that
[i]t would be ironic indeed if a law triggered by a Nation's concern over centuries of racial
injustice and intended to improve the lot of those who had "been excluded from the American
dream for so long," ... constituted the first legislative prohibition of all voluntary, private, raceconscious efforts to abolish traditional patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy.
/d. at 204 (quoting 110 CONG. REc. 6552 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey)).
237. /d. at 209.
238. /d. at 208. The Weber Court catalogued the circumstances that rendered lawful the affirmative action plan in that case:
(1) that the plan's purposes mirrored the goals of Title VII, i.e., they sought to alleviate or
eliminate discrimination;
(2) that the plan was designed to break down old patterns of racial segregation;
(3) that the plan c!id not unnecessarily trammel the interests of whites by
(a) forcing their discharge, or
(b) completely barring their employment or participation in the program there at issue;
(4) that the plan was temporary, a one-time correction of imbalance, rather than a plan to
maintain racial balance (the plan was designed to end when a proper percentage of blacks in
the employer's work force was reached).
See id.
239. /d. at 211 (Blackmun, J., concurring); see also Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S.
616, 630 (1986). A number of Justices have disagreed with the view that the employer adopting the
plan need not have discriminated. See id. at 652-53 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 657 (White, J.,
dissenting); id. at 664-68 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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he wrote, the Weber Court would deem a job category "traditionally segregated" if there had been a "societal history of purposeful exclusion of
blacks from the job category, resulting in a persistent disparity between
the proportion of blacks in the labor force and the proportion of blacks
among those who hold jobs within the category."240 Thus, under Weber,
societal discrimination, rather than discrimination by the employer, suffices for purposes of the requirement that the affirmative action plan be
designed to remedy racial imbalance resulting from segregation. 241
The standard for voluntary affirmative action by government employers is different. Cases subsequent to Weber have demonstrated that
voluntary plans adopted by government employers must be designed to
correct racial imbalance resulting from past segregation just as private
employers' plans must. In Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, 242
however, the Supreme Court held that a public employer's voluntary affirmative action plan must be predicated on a manifest imbalance in the
employer's work force resulting from that particular employer's own past
discrimination, rather than from discrimination perpetrated by society as
a whole. 243 The Wygant court did not actually require the employer to
240. Weber, 443 U.S. at 212 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun explained this view
in order to set forth his own disagreement with it. Blackmun's own view was that the Court should
adopt Judge Wisdom's position permitting voluntary affirmative action only by those employers and
unions that had committed "arguable violations" of Title VII. /d. at 213-14.
241. In Justice White's view, permitting "traditionally segregated job categories" to mean nothing more than societal discrimination, rather than employer discrimination, collapses the tests, so
that all that is truly required is "a manifest imbalance between one identifiable group and another in
an employer's labor force." Johnson, 480 U.S. at 657 (White, J., dissenting). On the question of
whether an employer had met the traditionally segregated criterion, Justice Scalia wrote, in Johnson,
that the criterion had not been met because the trial court had found expressly that the employer had
not discriminated. /d. at 659 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor, by contrast, was not so
interested in the factual question of whether prior discrimination had occurred, but rather in the
decisionmaker's state of mind when adopting the decree. Despite the trial court's finding of no
discrimination, she was satisfied that the criterion was met where a prima facie case of discrimination existed in the record. /d. at 652-53 (O'Connor, J., concurring). There are thus three tiers of
what might be required of voluntary affirmative action under Title VII:
Scalia:
Proof of egregious past discrimination by the employer (would prefer doing away
with affirmative action entirely). See id. at 670-71 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
O'Connor: evidence in the record to permit the decisionmaker to believe that the employer's
discrimination resulted in statistical disparity. See id. at 650-51 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
Brennan:
evidence in the record that women or minorities are underrepresented in the
employer's work force compared with the relevant external population. See id. at
631-32 (Brennan, J.).
Justice O'Connor's position does not call for analysis of the decisionmaker's subjective state of mind,
but only of the quantum of facts before the decisionmaker.
242. 476 u.s. 267 (1986).
243. /d. at 274. This requirement essentially was reaffirmed when the Supreme Court, in City of
Richmond v. Croson, predicted that the city could have met the strict scrutiny test for public sector
affirmative action if the city had been remedying the present effects of its own past discrimination.
City of Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469, 492 (1989) (plurality). Scholars disagree about the
extent to which the Croson case, which struck down Richmond's minority contract set-aside program under an equal protection strict scrutiny test, is a harbinger of the demise of affirmative action.
See David S. Cohen, The Evidentiary Predicate for Affirmative Action after Croson: A Proposal for
Shifting the Burden of Proof, 7 YALE L. & PoL'Y REV. 489 (1989).
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prove its own past discrimination, but did require the employer to have a
"strong basis" for believing that remedial efforts were necessary, that is,
that its own discrimination had resulted in the imbalance. 244
In the case of Johnson v. Transportation Agency,245 the Supreme
Court confirmed this distinction between the standards governing equal
protection challenges to government affirmative action and standards
governing Title VII challenges to public and private employer affirmative
action. 246 The Johnson Court explained that the issue in a Title VII challenge to an employer's affirmative action plan is whether the affirmative
action plan is designed to remedy underrepresentation due to past societal discrimination; whereas, the issue in cases of government employer
affirmative action is whether the plan is designed to remedy imbalance
resulting from the employer's own past discrimination. 247 The Court explained the disparity between standards for judging public and private
plans by the fact that government employers may be challenged under
the Equal Protection Clause, whereas private employers are subject only
to Title VII challenge. 248
The first prong of both Weber and Wygant requires not only that
past discrimination (societal or employer) occurred, but also that such
discrimination has resulted in a "conspicuous racial imbalance in traditionally segregated job categories. " 249 This imbalance is established
through statistics. To show that an imbalance exists, it is appropriate to
compare
the percentage of minorities or women in the employer's work force
with the percentage in the area labor market or general population
... in analyzing jobs that require no special expertise ... or training
programs designed to provide expertise, . . . . Where a job requires
special training, however, the comparison should be with those in
244. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 277. Justice O'Connor in a concurring opinion stated that the employer should not be required to make any formal findings of its own past discrimination, but should
have a firm basis for its position that the plan's purpose was truly to remedy the employer's past
discrimination. Id. at 286.
245. 480 U.S. 616, 620 (1987). Wygant and Johnson are not consent decree cases, but are directly on point by virtue of the Firefighters holding that affirmative action plans embodied in consent
decrees are to be judged according to the standards governing voluntary affirmative action adopted
extrajudically.
246. See Ronald W. Adelman, Voluntary Affirmative Action Plans by Public Employers: The
Disparity in Standards Between Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause, 56 FoRDHAM L. REV.
403 ( 1987). In fact, the Johnson case did involve a government plan, but the only challenge brought
was under Title VII, so there was no need to consider whether the plan violated the Constitution.
Johnson, 480 U.S. at 620 n.2.
247. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 632; id. at 659 (Scalia, J., dissenting). But see id. at 652 (O'Connor,
J., concurring). Apparently the societal discrimination that would suffice is the very generalized
societal discrimination that everyone agrees has taken place in this country. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at
278 n.5.
248. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 631. Justice O'Connor concurred in the Johnson decision, but stated
in her separate opinion that the Johnson facts had met the heightened standard set forth in Wygant.
/d. at 653 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
249. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 209 (1979); see Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274-78.
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the labor force who possess the relevant qualifications.250
As discussed below, the quantity of statistical disparity necessary to
demonstrate manifest imbalance falls something short of what would be
required to support a prima facie pattern and practice case of institutional discrimination. 251
In addition to the first Weber predicate, which requires that the affirmative action plan be designed to remedy imbalance resulting from
discrimination, the plan, whether adopted by a government or private
employer, must not "unnecessarily trammel" the rights of majority employees. 252 Thus in Weber, an affirmative action plan was permissible
because it did not result in the replacement of majority employees with
minority employees. 253 In fact, the Court noted, fifty percent of the individuals who could enter the apprenticeship program that was at issue in
Weber were white. 254 Similarly, in Johnson, the Court found that the
plan did not trammel the majority's rights unnecessarily. There, the
male plaintiff who was denied a promotion did not lose "firmly rooted
expectation[s]" in as much as he retained his position. Gender, moreover, was only one factor considered by the decisionmaker, rather than
being the sole criterion applied, which is to say the defendant adopted no
quotas. 255 To be deemed not to trammel the rights of the majority employees unnecessarily, the plan also must be designed to attain, rather
than maintain, a balanced work force. 256
These, then, are the substantive standards that have guided the
courts' post hoc review of affirmative action consent decrees and that
should be adopted for preview of such decrees. Knowledge of the substance of the standards, however, does not answer the question of how
those standards should apply in the context of a predecree. fairness hearing. The question of who should bear what evidentiary burdens remains.
250. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 632.
251. /d. But see id. at 654 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In a Title VII "pattern and practice"
case, the plaintiff makes a prima facie case by showing a statistical disparity between the percentage
of defendant's work force composed of minorities and the percentage of the population composed of
minorities. An adequate statistical disparity, combined with evidence of examples of situations
where employees were victims of intentional discrimination, creates the plaintiff's prima facie case.
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
252. Weber, 443 U.S. at 208.
253. /d. (citing McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976)).
254. /d.
255. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 631-36, 637-42.
256. /d. at 639-40. Whether because of the potential for prejudice created by sec. 108 or because of simple notions of efficiency, courts should apply these substantive doctrines to the decree at
the time of the fairness hearing. This discussion focuses on enhancement of proceedings at the
fairness hearing stage with the hope that resolution of matters at that stage will enhance efficiency.
Increasing efforts to resolve disputes as early as possible does not mean that majority employees
cannot challenge the decree after it has been entered. If an application to intervene meets the timeliness ahd other criteria discussed above, it should be granted. The standards discussed herein as
applicable to fairness hearing consideration of decrees similarly should continue to govern post hoc
review.
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As with substantive standards, the procedures for post hoc review should
be transplanted to the preview stage.
c.

Applying Post Hoc Review Standards to Preview of the
Decree

When a consent decree is challenged after adoption, the challengers
have two options. They may prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that the decisionmaker in the first suit did not have a strong basis in
evidence to believe that remedial action was necessary, or they may prove
by a preponderance of the evidence that the decree is unnecessarily
broad.257 To succeed in showing the lack of a strong basis in evidence to
support remedial action, the challengers of a private or government plan
must prove that the affirmative action program is not warranted by evidence of past societal discrimination or, in the case of a government plan
challenged under the Equal Protection Clause, that the employer's purpose was not, in fact, to remedy its own prior discrimination.258 If a
challenge relies on the inadequacy of evidence, the court reviewing the
consent decree need consider only whether there was adequate evidence
in the first suit indicating that the predicates for affirmative action existed, and need not decide as a factual matter whether such predicates in
fact ever existed. 259 Rather, the challenger must demonstrate to thereviewing court that the information available to the decisionmaker did not
constitute an adequate predicate.
The decisionmaker for purposes of adopting the decree could be
deemed either the parties to the decree or the court or both. If the decisionmaker includes the court entering the decree, then the challenger's
task is to point to the record that was before the district court at the time
that court approved the decree. If the decisionmaker is deemed to be the
employer alone, then it becomes incumbent upon the employer to get the
evidence of such predicates into the record only if and when the decree is
challenged. In the latter case, whether that evidence had been in the
record of the decree-entering district court would not matter. For pur257. See supra note 256 and accompanying text.
258. The heightened scrutiny required for equal protection challenges to affirmative action was
recently explained in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. , a minority set-aside case, rather than an
employment case. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). There, the Supreme
Court held that Richmond's programs for encouraging minority subcontractor participation in contracts let by the city were not defensible under an Equal Protection Clause challenge brought by
white subcontractors. /d. at 498-506. The Court subjected the plan to strict scrutiny review and
struck the plan · down as neither responsive to past discrimination by the City of Richmond nor
narrowly tailored to meet the city's ends. Croson similarly requires an evidentiary predicate to support a legislature's decision to adopt affirmative action. The Court struck down the "set-aside"
program in Croson because the City of Richmond produced no direct evidence that either the city or
its primary contractors had discriminated against minority-owned subcontractors. /d.
259. See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 634-36 (relying on agency plan findings of underrepresentation of
women to support conclusion that Weber requirements had been met). Thus the majority employees' challenge may be limited to the existent record, rather than requiring new evidence. But see
Firefighters v. Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 538 (1986) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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poses of post hoc review, then, the question of whether the decisionmaker should -be deemed to be the parties or the court will decide
whether evidence of the predicates must be in front of the decree-entering
court or only in the employer's possession at the time the court enters an
unchallenged decree.
The Firefighters case suggests that the employer, rather than the
court, should be treated as the decisionmaker. In Firefighters, the
Supreme Court ruled that Title VII limitations on courts' powers to order affirmative action do not apply to their powers to approve consent
decrees between parties. 260 Courts thus can approve consent decrees
containing provisions they could not themselves order. This suggests
that the decree-entering court is not the decisionmaker and need not itself be persuaded that the predicates are in place. O'Connor's concurrence in Firefighters confirms this, for it suggests that the parties bear no
duty to establish to the decree-entering court's satisfaction the decree's
legality. She would limit the court's duty of scrutiny merely to refraining
from entering an unopposed decree if the decree is facially illegal. 261 It
thus appears that it is the employer, rather than the court, that must
have an affirmative reason to believe the predicates are met. For cases of
post hoc review, then, whether in a collateral suit or in a post hoc challenge by intervenors in the decree suit, the record of the decree-entering
court need not contain evidence of the Weber predicates, as long as the
employer can produce such evidence in response to a challenge.
For preview of consent decrees, what should happen depends on
who is present. Assuming that majority employees have intervened or
otherwise have been joined in the suit, the court should permit the majority employees to proffer evidence on the absence of the evidentiary predicates (whether employer or societal discrimination) and on the
unnecessary breadth of the proposed decree. 262 The burden of persuasion on these issues is upon the challengers. 263 Because the issue is
whether the record contains certain evidence, however, there is essentially a burden upon the employer or the plaintiff to get such evidence
260. Firefighters, 478 U.S. at 526.
261. /d. at 531 (O'Connor, J., concurring). But see id. at 538 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)
(adjudication required before entry of decree).
Interestingly, in Firefighters the intervenors had raised no legal claims pertaining to the lawfulness of the decree. ld at 511. As a result, no occasion arose to consider the substantive legality of
the decree.
262. There is some support for the notion that courts are capable of insuring that a consent
decree comports with Weber, even absent the benefit of adversarial argument. See Culbreath v.
Dukakis, 630 F.2d 15 {lst Cir. 1980).
263. In Wygant, the Supreme Court stated that the district court reviewing such measures
must make a factual determination that the employer had a strong basis in evidence for its
conclusion that remedial action was necessary. The ultimate burden remains with the [majority] employees to demonstrate the unconstitutionality of an affirmative-action program. But
unless such a determination is made, an appellate court reviewing a challenge by nonminority
employees to remedial action cannot determine whether the race-based action is justified as a
remedy for prior discrimination.
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277-78 (1986).
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into the record so that the challenger will not be able to point to its
absence. 264 Although an employer presently bears no burden to get evidence of such predicates into the record at the fairness hearing, this is
bound to change if the court is to determine the decree's lawfulness
before its entry. When majority employees intervene in order to mount a
predecree challenge, the employer or minority employee must be in a
position to proffer evidence so that the majority employees may challenge
its sufficiency. As stated above, this evidence must be enough to support
the conclusion that remediation is indicated, but need not be enough to
establish a prima facie case. If no majority employees become party to
the decree suit, the threat to the interests of absentees and to the decree's
finality ~s far greater. Perhaps the parties to such unchallenged decrees
should acquire the burden of establishing that the Weber predicates are
met. 265 The next subpart contains a proposal for these cases.
3.

Protecting Absentees to Preserve Decrees

This subpart addresses the question of what evidentiary predicates a
court should require when no majority employees show up to challenge
the decree. If the proposals on intervention timeliness issues discussed
earlier in this article are adopted, 266 the absentees will be free to intervene when they learn of the detriment to their interests, even though that
discovery takes place long after entry of the decree. In order to avoid
having to dismantle the consent decree, the decree-entering court should
safeguard the interests of these absentees at the time it enters the
decree. 267
To do this, courts need to employ mechanisms that ensure elicitation of sufficient information from the parties to the decree to demon·strate that the predicates are in place and that the decree is not overly
broad. Courts can avoid subsequent challenges by employing mechanisms that protect the interests of nonparties who are, by definition, not
only absent, but also unnotified and unrepresented by anyone present in
264. The burden, then, is not upon the employer that adopted the plan to prove that the
Weber/Wygant predicates are in place. See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 653
(1986). It may sound strange to say that the burden of proof is on the challenger when, in fact, it is
the defending employer that must supply the evidence. The employer must supply the evidence, not
because it technically bears an evidentiary burden, but rather because the issue in dispute is whether
the court (or the parties) did indeed have before it (or them) evidence of a manifest imbalance related
to traditionally segregated job categories. Thus the employer, or sometimes the court, must have
evidence suggesting the manifest imbalance. It is only by proving that such evidence is wanting that
the challenger can win. See also Janowiak v. Corporate City of South Bend, 836 F.2d 1034, 1039-40
(7th Cir. 1984).
265. See supra note 251. The decree may, of course, receive appellate review, but appellate
courts apply a mere abuse of discretion standard. Firefighters was itself a collateral attack, so it does
not necessarily resolve the issue of what should happen at the fairness hearing to protect the interests
of unrepresented majority employees, who may otherwise subject the decree to collateral attack.
266. See supra notes 123-65 and accompanying text.
267. Cf United States v. City of Chicago, 870 F.2d 1256, 1259 (7th Cir. 1989) (intervention 13
years after conclusion of suit too late; collateral attack available).
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the suit. 268 Such mechanisms might be either intrinsic or extrinsic to the
decree suit.
Intrinsic mechanisms are those that operate within the parameters
of the decree suit. They might be either human or structural. A human
mechanism could be in the form of an amicus, a guardian ad litem, 269 or
an organization such as the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) (when the EEOC is not a party) appointed by the court to
argue on behalf of unnamed people potentially affected. A major question whenever human resources are tapped is who would pay. Structural
protection, because it involves protective procedures rather than human
labor, might save expense. Two possible structural protective devices are
guidelines and presumptions. Judges might follow specific guidelines
crafted by an entity like the EEOC, an independent commission, or an
office within the judiciary. One problem with this alternative is that the
guidelines would be static, unable to respond to the idiosyncrasies of particular cases the way an advocate could. For this reason, the guidelines
would have to reflect the results of careful study of a broad range of real
cases, so that the court would be alerted to arguments that might have
been made if an interested party had been there to make them. The other
structural protection would involve a legal presumption. A presumption
against approval of the consent decree could become part of the fairness
hearing. The prime difficulty with use of a presumption against approval
of the decree is that it would undermine a heretofore clearly expressed
congressional preference for settlements and would thwart the rule of
Wygant and Johnson that the burden be placed upon those challenging
the legality of an affirmative action plan. 270
An extrinsic protection is one that operates outside the suit itself to
protect the interests of absentees from the suit. The judiciary could employ a centralized system for expert review of consent decrees. The
EEOC, when not a party, might serve in this capacity or might coordinate such a system. Problems with such extrinsic protection would be
the complexity and time-consumption that referral to the outside agency
would entail and the diminishment in trial court autonomy that would
result. Another problem with this alternative is expense, although
money could be saved if unbiased think tanks and academic institutions
could be signed up to provide expertise on a pro bono basis.
Use of these types of mechanisms, whether intrinsic or extrinsic,
268. The argument was made earlier that courts should assume they are making decisions contrary to law when d~iding whether the interests of absentees in a lawful decision are threatened. See
supra note 109 and accompanying text. That argument should not be taken to imply that courts can
never be trusted to see that the interests of absentees are protected. The fact that, for effective
operation of Rules 19 and 24, courts should assume their decisions are wrong does not mean that
they cannot, with precautions, assure right decisions.
269. See Thomas H. Odom, When Consent Decrees are Lacking Consent, LEGAL TiMES, July
30, 1990, at 20.
270. See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 626 (1987) (citing Wygant v. Jackson
Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277-78 (1986)).
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would give courts a substitute for adversarial argument on the legality of
the decree. The interests of absentee employees would, in effect, be represented artificially, with the result that post hoc challenges would be
destined to fail and become unattractive alternatives. To assure representation of absentees' interests in the predecree stage would assure decree
finality because the decree would have survived the type of Weber challenge the majority employees would raise upon a subsequent collateral
challenge.
V.

CONCLUSION

Martin v. Wilks left an open invitation for majority employees to
mount collateral challenges to consent decrees resolving suits by minority employees against their employer. The 1991 Civil Rights Act will
limit most challenges to the decree suit itself, thereby serving the ends of
both Title VII and judicial economy. This statutory bar against collateral attacks will adequately protect the interests of majority employees
and the finality of consent decrees if courts take appropriate precautions
in construing the joinder rules and in considering proposed consent
decrees.
Two joinder rules are relevant. The majority employees may intervene in the minorities' suit against the employer. If the majority employees do not seek intervention, then a party to the suit, or the court sua
· sponte, may seek their joinder as necessary or indispensable parties.
Analysis of Rule 24, governing intervention, suggests that intervention
·should be allowed freely in these cases. Analysis of Rule 19, governing
necessary and indispensable parties, suggests that majority employees
usually should be deemed neither necessary nor indispensable in these
circumstances. However they become parties to the decree suit, majority
employees are in a position to participate in negotiations and help shape
any ensuing. consent decree, and their interests are thus adequately protected, without resort to collateral challenges.
Regardless of whether majority employees actually join in the decree suit, the court should take the opportunity of the fairness hearing to
assure that the Weber predicates are in place. When the majority is not
represented, courts may protect majority employee interests even in the
absence of anyone challenging the decree. Mechanisms extrinsic and intrinsic to the suit can supply the guidance and perspective needed to assure that the consent decree comports with Weber standards, and thus
does not violate majority rights. By protecting majority employee interests, use of such mechanisms will insure the finality of consent decrees.

